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Abstract
Today, the Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the most important emerging technolo-
gies. Applicable to several fields, it has the potential to strongly influence people’s lives.
“Things” are mostly embedded machines, and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communica-
tions are used to exchange information. The main aspect of this type of communication
is that a “thing” needs a mechanism to uniquely identify other “things” without human
intervention. For this purpose, trust plays a key role. Trust can be incorporated in the
smartness of “things” by using mobile “agents”.
From the study of the IoT ecosystem, a new threat against M2M communications
has been identified. This relates to the opportunity for an attacker to employ several
forged IoT-embedded machines that can be used to launch attacks. Two “things-aware”
detection mechanisms have been proposed and evaluated in this work for incorporation
into IoT mobile trust agents. These new mechanisms are based on observing specific
thing-related behaviour obtained by using a characterisation algorithm.
The first mechanism uses a range of behaviours obtained from real embedded ma-
chines, such as threshold values, to detect whether a target machine is forged. This
detection mechanism is called machine emulation detection algorithm (MEDA). MEDA
takes around 3 minutes to achieve a detection accuracy of 79.21%, with 44.55% of real
embedded machines labelled as belonging to forged embedded machines. These results
indicated a need to develop a more accurate and faster detection method. Therefore, a
second mechanism was created and evaluated. A dataset composed of behaviours from
real, virtual and emulated embedded systems that can be part of the IoT was created.
This was used for both training and testing classification methods. The results iden-
tified Random Forest (RF) as the most efficient method, recognising forged embedded
machines in only 5 seconds with a detection rate of around 99.5%. It follows that this
solution can be applied in real IoT scenarios with critical conditions.
In the final part of this thesis, an attack against these new mechanisms has been
proposed. This consists of using a modified kernel of a powerful machine to mimic
the behaviour of a real IoT-embedded machine, referred to as a fake timing attack
(FTA). Two metrics, mode and median from ping response time, have been found to
effectively detect this attack. The final detection method involves combining RF and
k -Nearest Neighbour to successfully detect forged embedded machines and FTA in only
40 seconds, with an overall detection performance (ODP) of 99.9% and 93.70% respec-
tively. This method also was evaluated using behaviours from embedded machines that
were not present in the training set. The results from that evaluation demonstrate that
the proposed solution can detect embedded machines unknown to the method, both real
and virtual, with an ODP of 99.96% and 99.92% respectively.
In summary, a new algorithm able to detect forged embedded machines easily,
quickly and with very high accuracy has been developed. The proposed method ad-
dresses the challenge of securing present and future M2M-embedded machines with
power-constrained resources and can be applied to real IoT scenarios.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The number of Internet-connected “things” is increasing rapidly. It is estimated that to-
day there are already between 5 and 15 billion devices connected to the Internet. Around
35 billion “things” are expected to be connected by 2020, of which 13 billion are likely
to be wirelessly connected. These “things” connected to the Internet are part of the
Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm and their cooperation through Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) communications will be fundamental to achieving specific and complex goals.
This type of communication is characterised by the fact that there is no human inter-
vention.
The rapidly growing number of “things” connected to the Internet is leading to
security issues that have been highlighted by researchers and media news. As these
communications increase over time, there is also the opportunity for attackers to exploit
them and consequently attack the network or part of it. These attacks can lead to
several issues, from the loss of end-user privacy to a large-scale economic impact. It is
quite obvious that securing the communication among “things” must be a prioritised
factor before continuing to deploy them. In this scenario, trust has an important role in
assuring that the exchange of information is secure and reliable. Terms such as “thing”,
“object”, “device”, “node” and “machine” are used interchangeably throughout this
thesis. Moreover, the term “object” means everything that is not directly related to
human beings.
1.1 Internet-connected Things
Objects that will be part of the IoT must have access to the IoT infrastructure in order
to communicate with other objects. To do this, objects must have at least one network
interface. There are currently various networks that can be used to connect objects in
the IoT [2–4]:
• Wired networks: a network type in which all the components are connected using
cables;
1
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• Wireless networks: a network type in which all the wireless components are con-
nected using radio waves such as:
– Cellular networks: a wireless network in which all the mobile components are
connected through cells;
– Body networks: a wireless network in which the components are body sensor
units;
– Vehicular networks: a wireless network specific for vehicles;
• Sensor networks: a wired or wireless network in which the components are sensor
nodes.
The general idea is that M2M communications use a wireless data connection as a
link between systems, remote devices or locations and individuals [5]. The standards for
wireless networks with an important role for connecting machines in the IoT are [2, 4]:
• Wi-Fi networks: IEEE 802.11;
• Bluetooth: IEEE 802.15.1;
• Wireless Sensor Network (WSN): IEEE 802.15.4 or ZigBee;
• Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) networks: ISO 18000;
• Cellular networks: Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), IEEE 802.16, Long-Term Evolution
(LTE) or 5G.
Table 1.1 shows the objects that can be part of the IoT along with their corresponding
features. When available, the main characteristics of these objects may be subdivided
as follows [6]:
• CPU: from embedded to high performance processor, such as ARM, MIPS, Pow-
erPC, AVR, x86, x86-64, etc.;
• OS: open source and proprietary, such as Linux-based, Windows-based, iOS-based,
Contiki, etc.;
• Data storage: from a few KB to a TB;
• Random Access Memory (RAM): from a few KB to a GB;
• Network interface: from one to multiple interfaces at the same time, such as wired,
RFID, Bluetooth, ZigBee, Wi-Fi, GSM, etc.;
• Power : from no power to high power, battery and/or wired;
• Type: mobile or static.
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Most of these things are mainly embedded systems with different capabilities and
complexities, starting from a simple smart sensor to a more sophisticated device. These
have low-to-medium capabilities, and therefore could easily be compromised by attack-
ers.
Almost every object in the world could be part of the IoT, but every object is not
part of it a priori. An object can be part of the IoT if there are at least two main
capabilities: connectivity and smart capabilities. For example, a simple temperature
sensor cannot be part of the IoT, because there is a lack of intelligence. An object
can be defined smart when it has the capability to collect information, in many cases
elaborate it, and transfer it to other objects or to the IoT system, whereas connectivity
capability allows objects to be connected to and interact with the IoT infrastructure
and other IoT objects. In this example, a simple sensor becomes a smart sensor. The
intelligent capability can be included in the object by using IoT mobile agents, from
now on called “agents”. An agent is a piece of software that takes in input information,
mostly from the real-world environment, processes it and forwards it to the IoT system
or other agents for further processing. An agent can also receive information from the
IoT system or other agents with the aim of accomplishing a task. Agents are not like
other software applications that can run in objects; these allow objects to intelligently
communicate with each other for achieving specific goals. Agents aim to facilitate M2M
and Machine-to-Human (M2H) interactions by understanding the environment in which
objects are used and to give them the ability to speak the same language [7–9].
1.2 Real-Life Scenarios
At present, there are various applications of M2M communications that have started
to emerge in several fields, such as Intelligent Healthcare Systems (IHS), Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS), Intelligent Building Systems (IBS), smart robots, manu-
facturing systems and smart grids [3, 10, 11]. In this context, an unprecedented increase
in M2M data will occur. It is possible to envision that things will manage and control
part of human life in an autonomous way. We will interact with things and these will
adapt our environment based on predefined requirements. This will happen primarily in
a passive way and without a direct request from the user. The following subsections de-
scribe examples of real-life scenarios which highlight the importance of IoT and therefore
M2M devices.
1.2.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems
In this first scenario the aim is to reduce fuel consumption, reduce CO2 emissions, im-
prove vehicle and driving safety, improve traffic efficiency, enable drivers to receive exter-
nal information etc. In this, M2M devices can create three types of networks: Vehicle-to-
Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Human (V2H). In V2V,
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information is exchanged among devices; in V2I, information is exchanged between de-
vices and the IoT infrastructure; and in V2H, information is exchanged between devices
and humans. This IoT system is composed of smart objects installed and configured in
“things” such as vehicles, roads, goods, service areas etc. [12, 13]
A possible ITS scenario involving cars is as follows:
• Improve navigation:
– Drivers choose to drive or to use the autopilot.
– The car suggests the fastest route by considering information obtained by
other vehicles and the ITS, i.e. traffic, accidents, weather conditions etc.
– The ITS uses roadside signs to alert vehicles of possible accidents, road con-
gestion etc. If appropriate, it suggests alternative routes and adjusts traffic
lights by considering the real-time traffic flow, choosing to change the timing
of red and green lights.
• Improve road safety:
– The car alerts the user to any problem with the vehicle, e.g. low fuel level,
low battery power, motor problems etc. It is able to suggest in real-time the
closest and cheapest petrol station, car repair garage etc.
– If the user is driving, sensors help them stay in the correct lane, give infor-
mation about distances, assist with parking etc.
– Pedestrians crossing the road may be advised about nearby cars that would
not be able to stop in time, suggest the closest cross-walk etc.
– The ITS alerts cars of any pedestrian crossing the street, especially when there
is poor street visibility caused by adverse weather conditions or obstacles such
as walls, parked cars etc.
– In case of an accident, cars can call emergency services automatically by
providing the current location, driver and passenger health status, number of
vehicles involved etc.
• Improve passenger entertainment:
– Access the Internet, for example, to download music, videos etc.
– Adjust audio and luminosity levels in the vehicle.
1.2.2 Intelligent Healthcare Systems
In this scenario, the aim is to improve patient-doctor relationships, increase human
health conditions, increase patients’ health monitoring, decrease spread of disease, el-
derly care etc. Here, M2M devices such as smart body sensors, local network devices
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etc. would have an important role in reporting patients’ conditions and sending alerts
to the IoT system [14–16].
Possible future scenarios involving the IHS are as follows:
• Medical records of patients are available everywhere in case of emergency and
historical records can be used by the IHS to prevent future health problems.
• In the event of an emergency, information from smart body sensors of a patient
may be used to alert the nearest ambulance. Meanwhile, the IHS suggests the
fastest route to the nearest hospital.
• In case of a new disease, the IHS predicts its spread before it becomes a national
or global risk, alerting national competent authorities and the World Health Or-
ganization.
• By collecting information from body sensors, the IHS can advise the user what
action to take to prevent a disease.
1.2.3 Intelligent Building Systems
In this scenario, the aim is to optimize building energy consumption, improve building
safety and security, optimize building occupancy etc. In this, M2M devices such as
smart meters, smart sensors, smart LED lights, smart closed-circuit television (CCTV)
cameras, etc. provide specific information to the central system [17–19].
Possible IBS scenarios involving users of buildings are as follows:
• The IBS manages the lighting system to reduce energy consumption depending on
user location, external and internal light levels etc.
• The number and location of users in big buildings such as shopping centres, air-
ports, rail stations etc. are used to suggest the fastest way to reach a place of
interest (shop, gate, platform, etc.) by considering the flow of people, in which
floors the elevators are on, escalator status etc.
• In case of fire or an emergency, the IBS suggests to the user the nearest and safest
exit, alerts the fire station and ambulances, turns off all unnecessary equipment in
order to contain the fire, limit the damage caused, protect users etc.
• In domestic buildings, the IBS can automatically manage the entertainment system
by adjusting the lighting and volume, playing the user’s preferred music, suggesting
movies etc. It can alert the user when guests are arriving by recognizing their facial
features or by their location. It can also alert the user if there is a thief on the
premises or inside the home and automatically call the police.
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1.3 Threats Against Things and the Internet of Things
The increase in deployment of the IoT is leading to a corresponding increase in attacks
against things and the IoT infrastructure. Figure 1.1 shows the trend in top news
on attacks against the system based on news websites, technology-based magazines and
companies including the BBC [20–33], CNN [34–36], The Guardian [37, 38], The Inquirer
[39–41], The Register [42, 43], The Washington Post [44], Technology Review [45–48],
Scientific American [49], Wired [50–54], Forbes [55–61], Computerworld [62–68], PC
World [69–74], Symantec [75], Trend Micro [76–90] and Sucuri [91, 92].
Starting from 2010, the year in which IoT began to emerge, things also began to be
attacked. The Stuxnet worm was used not only to attack nuclear centrifuges, but also
to destroy them. In 2011, embedded things began to be compromised by using wireless
connections. A car was attacked via Bluetooth and used to make unauthorised cell-phone
calls. Later, in 2013, the core of the IoT infrastructure began to be attacked. Domain
Name System (DNS) servers were attacked by using a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack and the Internet was greatly slowed down. The followed year, both the
IoT infrastructure and things were attacked. Sony Pictures was attacked, causing gaming
consoles, TVs and smartphones to be disconnected from its entertainment network [56].
In May 2015, the first worst case scenario happened: Internet-connected embedded
things such as CCTV cameras were hacked and used to attack the IoT infrastructure
by launching a DDoS attack [73]. In the same year, other attacks took place in which
embedded things had a major role by being used to attack the IoT infrastructure.
As Figure 1.1 indicates, from 2012 on, embedded things were increasingly targeted
by attackers and then used to attack the IoT infrastructure or part of it. These attacks
happened because embedded systems are left mostly without any kind of protection.
This exposure gives attackers an opportunity to compromise and remotely use them for
malicious purposes. Recently, hackers compromised a fish tank in a North American
casino to attack its network and gather private information. It was used to send data to
another device in Finland [93]. Another news item showed how a security flaw, called
“Devil’s Ivy”, can be used to compromise IoT devices from large 24 companies, in-
cluding Bosch, Canon, Cisco, D-Link, Fortinet, Hitachi, Honeywell, Huawei, Mitsubishi,
Netgear, Panasonic, Sharp, Siemens, Sony and Toshiba [94]. This flaw allows access to
the IoT devices by giving attackers full remote control, which gives them the opportu-
nity to use these devices for perpetrating other attacks. It should be noted that Figure
1.1 shows only the reported attacks, therefore, the total number of attacks perpetrated
against the IoT may be greater. This could be because companies usually do not report
attacks in order to avoid reputational damage, therefore there could be attacks that,
although unreported, took place nevertheless.
Today, automated systems are present in the field for monitoring and scanning IoT
devices and their vulnerabilities, such as Masscan [95], Nmap [96], Shodan [97] etc.
In particular, Shodan gives the opportunity to search IoT devices by specifying their
type, location etc. Results are shown in a graphical interface with details of the devices
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Figure 1.1: Trend of top attack news against things and the IoT infrastructure.
Attacks against embedded things are highlighted. Attacks related to both things and
the IoT infrastructure are shown. In 2013, things and the IoT infrastructure were
attacked for the first time and at the same time, while in 2015, compromised embedded
things were used to attack the IoT infrastructure.
including IP address, location, open ports, credentials etc. In 2013, more than 1.2 billion
Internet-connected machines were tracked down, with an average of 300 million new scan
probes per month [98]. Table 1.2 shows results from a Shodan search of IoT devices,
common services and ports, and major companies that provide networking equipment.
The results show that there are between 4 and 14 million possible IoT-embedded
devices present in the database considering major companies. There are also around
16,000 possible Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and 24,000
devices using Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT), a well-known connectivity
protocol for M2M communications accessible from the Internet.
1.4 Motivation, Aims and Objectives
The trend of attacks against the system and things is growing yearly, and security
measures are therefore paramount to ensure their protection. Securing the IoT must
be prioritised before continuing to deploy it in the real world and on a large scale. To
continue to create an insecure IoT system can lead to an increasing number of attacks
against the IoT infrastructure and IoT machines. This can affect human lives greatly;
in fact, corruption of IoT systems such as ITS, IHS and IBS can endanger people’s
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Table 1.2: Shodan results for IoT devices, companies, common ports and embedded
OSs. Results were retrieved on the 28th of January 2017.
Search Results
C
om
m
on
d
ev
ic
es
Camera 326,447
Dreambox 4,876
Firewall 101,169
NAS 72,666
Polycom 8,514
Printer 153,359
Switch 167,350
Router 2,352,549
Wireless 792,802
M
a
jo
r
co
m
p
an
ie
s
ASUS 71,102
Cisco 9,980,648
Hewlett-Packard 28,371
Huawei 525,838
Linksys 34,303
Netgear 246,236
Panasonic 19,800
Samsung 40,229
Sony 4,793
Synology 40,472
TP-Link 493,590
Ubiquiti 2,069,077
VMware 172,184
ZyXEL 522,041
C
om
m
on
T
C
P
p
or
ts
port:22 - Secure Shell (SSH) 13,392,387
port:23 - Telnet 6,842,709
port:80 - Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 65,716,279
port:443 - HTTP Secure (HTTPS) 45,495,186
port:502 - Modbus-SCADA 15,926
port:631 - Internet Printing Protocol (IPP) 496,405
port:902 - VMware ESXi 169,671
port:1883 - Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) 24,314
port:5001 - Synology Inc. 457,176
port:5222 - Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) 228,756
E
m
b
ed
d
ed
O
S
s
Android/2.2 52,660
Contiki 202
DD-WRT 52,287
OpenWRT 19,215
Raspbian 87,148
Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) 971
Tiny WebServer 2,617
Embedded 325,475
IoT 4,763
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lives. Machines, and especially embedded machines, must have the capability to protect
themselves and their communications. In this scenario, trust has an important role in
assuring that the exchange of information is secure. Trust can be defined as “the belief
that another party will behave according to a set of well-established rules and thus meet
one’s expectations” [99].
In the IoT paradigm, there are several open issues. The first issue relates to the
security of data collected and transmitted by M2M devices inside the network. The
second issue is network security, which refers to the integrity of communication between
M2M devices and the core network. Another issue relates to the security scalability
of the system involving billion of devices exchanging information. A further issue is
the lack of a standardised framework for M2M communications in the IoT, including
a Trust Management Framework (TMF). Moreover, major attention needs to be paid
to the security of embedded machines and their communications due to their specific
characteristics, such as low capabilities that make them more susceptible to attacks and
easily compromised and most important, the fact that they manage a large amount of
data.
These issues are enhanced if several M2M devices misbehave inside the network at
the same time. In this situation, it will be difficult for other well-behaving M2M devices
to exchange information securely and detect and isolate attackers. Recently, attackers
have begun to use Virtual Machines (VMs) to launch attacks [100]. VMs allow an
attacker to:
• Generate multiple distributed attacks at the same time by using one or more
powerful machines;
• Be undetected by the victim, because each VM will be identified as a real machine;
• Remove attack traces easily by deleting a file or restoring the previous VM status.
At the moment, there are no mechanisms to properly detect VMs in a network,
which makes these types of devices extremely vulnerable to attacks. Instead, most
research efforts are focused on protecting VMs from attackers, as these are mostly used
in cloud-based systems. Another aspect is ensuring VMs are isolated to prevent an
attacker from seeing information belonging to other VMs in the same server. A third area
of research is focused on the use of VMs to analyse behaviours of computer malware. In
fact, these provide a perfect isolated environment for studying their behaviours without
compromising the host system. Furthermore, VMs are used by researchers to simulate
attackers and therefore launch attacks in a network [101–109]. However, there has been
no special efforts thus far to detect and prevent attackers from using VMs as an attack
vector. Table 1.2 shows that online there are at least 170,000 VMware ESXi Hypervisors
that theoretically could be used to run multiple embedded systems for attacking the IoT
network.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate new methodologies that permit machines
to reliably trust each other in order to securely exchange information in IoT M2M
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communications, with special attention to embedded systems. The objectives are firstly,
to understand what the IoT architecture should be and how to establish reliable trust
metrics among machines, and secondly, to evaluate and compare TMFs adopted with
the goal of understanding their effectiveness. This will be achieved by considering the
proposed IoT standards and models. Finally, an important issue related to the security
in the IoT system will be identified and addressed. This consists of the opportunity for
an attacker to use multiple virtual and emulated embedded systems (VESs) to replicate
real embedded machines (REMs), and consequently to threaten the IoT system. This
represents a problem for (i) the security of data collected and transmitted by M2M
devices inside the network and (ii) the integrity of communication between M2M devices
and the core network. The lack of framework standardisations for M2M communications
in the IoT reduces the opportunity to find a solution to address this problem. Despite
this obstacle, in the course of this research, a solution that can be used in different
circumstances and is easily applicable to future IoT devices has been identified. The basis
for this solution is the employability of mobile agents used as vehicles of trust. Mobile
agents retrieve the information needed for performing the computation and evaluation
of trust, which is the main aspect studied in this thesis. This is one of the most reliable
mechanisms for creating M2M communications among IoT devices.
1.5 Contributions and Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 1: Introduction
A brief introduction to Internet-connected things and IoT was carried out by considering
real-life scenarios and the threats associated with them. A context-aware classification
and review of the capabilities of IoT devices was presented in Section 1.1, underlining
the importance of securing embedded systems.
This chapter highlights the importance of securing the IoT system by looking at
problems related to real-case scenarios (Section 1.2). In Section 1.3, an up-to-date review
of attacks against IoT devices and the IoT architecture was carried out by looking at top
news trends worldwide. In this way, the motivation, aims and objectives of this work
were highlighted (Section 1.4).
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
Background information related to the current status of IoT (Section 2.1), M2M com-
munications (Section 2.2), emerging trends in IoT (Section 2.3) and TMFs (Section 2.4)
applied to them are outlined in this chapter.
In Section 2.5, a study of current issues associated with deploying available TMFs in
IoT/M2M scenarios is presented. Particular attention is paid to issues relate to deploy
these solutions by using IoT/M2M-embedded devices.
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Chapter 3: A New Threat and a Novel Solution: Machine Emulation Detec-
tion Algorithm
In this chapter, a new threat against IoT/M2M devices is studied. A background analysis
of current approaches to detect this threat is provided. A novel detection method for
addressing this problem is proposed, along with a comparison with other techniques.
In Section 3.1 the threat model is presented in which multiple VESs are used to
attack the M2M communication. Moreover, worst-case scenarios applied to real life
scenarios are shown to highlight the real threats that could occur in unsecured situations
(Section 3.2). Section 3.3 provides a background of current solutions used for detecting
VESs. In Section 3.4, a novel solution, called Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm
(MEDA), to this problem is presented. Results are presented in Section 3.5, followed by
a comparison with current methods to detect VESs and MEDA.
Chapter 4: A Classification Approach to Detecting Forged Embedded Ma-
chines
A new classification-based approach to detect illegitimate embedded machines in IoT
M2M communications is described in this chapter. In order to choose the best solution,
several steps were carried out. These steps include the creation of a dataset, the evalu-
ation of several feature selection methods and classification algorithms, and a review of
results from a simulated attack.
The background to and motivation for designing a new approach to detecting VESs
in IoT is presented in Section 4.1. This approach resolves some issues related to the
MEDA by using and testing several classification methods. A new classification-based
approach is then studied and presented in Section 4.2. The detection of different VESs
is described and an extensive analysis of simulation results is proposed in Section 4.3,
followed by a comparison with MEDA.
Chapter 5: Attack and Defence in Behavioural Tests
An attack against the behaviour detection methods proposed in this work is shown in
this chapter. A defence method resilient against this attack is then illustrated. Finally,
the performance of this solution is tested using real and virtual embedded systems that
are not present in the dataset. This gives the opportunity to study the applicability of
the detection method to future IoT machines.
In Section 5.1, the threat model against behavioural tests is presented by highlighting
a potential attack. A simulated fake timing attack in which the kernel of a powerful ma-
chine is modified by using information from the dataset in order to mimic the behaviour
of an REM is studied and illustrated in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, the detection model
is presented which makes improvements to the classification-based approach presented
in Chapter 4. Simulations and results obtained in detecting this attack are shown in
Section 5.4, alongside a comparison with behavioural tests. In order to evaluate the
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performance of the final detection method, unknown embedded VESs and REMs are
tested (Section 5.5). This solution is proven to be applicable to different IoT M2M
scenarios; it operates with different standards and IoT devices independently by the
system architecture and the OS. It is also resilient against timing attacks and capable
of classifying unknown IoT devices, making it easily applicable to future IoT-embedded
systems. The applicability of the proposed solution to architectural reference models
proposed, the feasibility of its implementation and its benefits in real-life scenarios are
shown in Section 5.6.
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work
Final conclusions and considerations in evaluating the applicability of the solution pro-
posed in Chapter 5 are presented in Section 6.1. In this chapter, the contribution and
findings of this thesis are shown (Section 6.2). In Section 6.3, further research directions
on the subject are proposed. Finally, a summary of the research is presented in Section
6.4. Additional information and bibliographic references are provided after this chapter.
1.6 Publication List
The following publications are the outputs of my research findings:
Valerio Selis and Alan Marshall, ‘MEDA: a Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm’,
in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
(SECRYPT 2015) [6].
Valerio Selis and Alan Marshall, ‘A classification-based algorithm to detect forged
embedded machines in IoT environments’, in IEEE Systems Journal (accepted for pub-
blication) [110].
Valerio Selis and Alan Marshall, ‘A Fake Timing Attack Against Behavioural Tests
Used in Embedded IoT M2M Communications’, in Proceedings of the 1st Cyber Security
in Networking Conference (CSNet’17) [111].

Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter the background analysis related to the Internet of Things (IoT),
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications and trust is provided. Current work in
these fields is presented and the architectural reference models for IoT and M2M in
IoT, emerging trends in IoT and Trust Management Frameworks (TMFs) for IoT are
highlighted. An overview of the limitations of currently proposed solutions for trust in
IoT are then identified.
2.1 Internet of Things
The impact of the IoT began to be acknowledged in 2010, when the first estimate of
the number of Internet-connected devices was made by Ericsson, who envisaged that
50 billion devices would be connected to the Internet by 2020 [112]. In 2011, Cisco
confirmed this estimate [113], while Machina Research (MR) forecasted around 24 bil-
lion, less than half the number forecast in other estimations. The following year, the
International Business Machines (IBM) corporation expected 1 trillion “things” to be
connected by 2015 [114]. This last estimation was too optimistic and has proven to be
completely false, as shown in Table 2.1. Between 2013 and 2016, other organizations
such as Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA), International
Data Corporation (IDC), Gartner, National Cable & Telecommunications Association
(NCTA), Business Insider (BI) and IHS Markit have tried to estimate the number of IoT
devices. The prediction of 50 billion devices connected by 2020 made by Ericsson and
Cisco became very popular. While Cisco stands by that expectation, Ericsson has been
adjusting their predictions yearly and reduced it by half in 2016. Today, the Cisco esti-
mate seems to be unrealistic. Meanwhile, a figure of around 30 billion by 2020 seems to
be more realistic. Recent estimates from IHS Markit [115], MR [116] and Ericsson [117]
are very different, ranging from 29 billion in 2022 to 27 or 75.4 billion in 2025. These
numbers underscore the high degree of uncertainty in relation to when the IoT will be
ready to work properly and to be deployed worldwide. Trendlines of these forecasts are
shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Forecast of connected IoT devices.
Currently, there is no agreed definition of the “Internet of Things” (IoT); the concept
is continuously evolving. The origins of the term are also in question. According to [128],
the term IoT was coined by Peter T. Lewis in 1985 and described as “the integration of
people, processes and technology with connectable devices and sensors to enable remote
monitoring, status, manipulation and evaluation of trends of such devices”. However,
most publications give credit to Kevin Ashton, who mentioned the term in association
with Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) technologies during a presentation in 1999,
in which he stated that “the IoT has the potential to change the world, just as the Inter-
net did. Maybe even more so”. Moreover, some researchers [129–132] emphasised that
the concept was not new and that it was envisioned by Nikola Tesla in 1926 during an
interview with Colliers magazine conducted by John B. Kennedy [133]. In that inter-
view, Tesla stated that:
when wireless is perfectly applied the whole earth will be converted into a huge brain,
which in fact it is, all things being particles of a real and rhythmic whole. [...] and the
instruments through which we shall be able to do this will be amazingly simple compared
with our present telephone. A man will be able to carry one in his vest pocket.
Today, the Oxford English Dictionary Online defines the IoT as “the interconnection
via the Internet of computing devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling them to
send and receive data” [134]. Tan and Wang [135] described the IoT as a system with
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new types of communication moving from a Human-to-Human (H2H) era to a Thing-
to-Thing (T2T) era. At every time and in every place, there will be connectivity for
everything, allowing information to be always available. Things will become smart in
order to process information, self-configure, self-maintain and self-repair, and especially
to make autonomous decisions. Authors in [136] described the IoT as a combination
of people, processes and devices with the capability to sense and act. This will enable
a variety of smart objects to make real-time decisions by using innovative addressing
schemes, secure communications and standardised frameworks for their interactions.
The Telecommunication Standardization Sector of the International Telecommunication
Union (International Telecommunication Union (ITU)) defines the IoT as “a global in-
frastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting
(physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information
and communication technologies” [137]. In 2015, the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (IEEE) imagined the IoT as “a self-configuring and adaptive complex
system made out of networks of sensors and smart objects whose purpose is to intercon-
nect ‘all’ things, including every day and industrial objects in such a way to make them
intelligent, programmable and more capable of interacting with humans” [138].
These definitions of the IoT imply several challenges that must be addressed such
as: real-time processing, information distribution, automated system management and
monitoring, interoperability of different systems, scalability, security, mobility, hetero-
geneity, service discovery and delivery etc. In this thesis, the ITU definition is used with
the extension that interconnected objects must be smart to be part of the IoT system.
2.2 Machine-to-Machine Communications
While the IoT is the future, its foundations are a form of enhanced Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) communications. An M2M communication refers to a type of communication
that enables machines to communicate with each other mainly without human interven-
tion. This type of communication allows machines to collect data from the real world;
thereafter, through applications, this data is made available to the end-user. An M2M
solution has four main components:
• M2M Device: this is a physical device used to collect data from the real world which
it then sends to the network or to other M2M devices. As discussed in Chapter
1, these devices can vary from a low-end sensor to a complex, high-end system.
However, not all M2M devices can be part of the IoT system, as emphasised
previously in this chapter;
• M2M Application: this is the application that collects and manages data from
M2M devices. This usually resides in a remote server;
• Network: this enables the connectivity among M2M devices and M2M applications;
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• M2M Service Enablement: provides identical functionalities among different ap-
plications.
The main differences between the IoT and M2M communications are that the latter
are mainly focused on point-to-point communications, while the former use the Internet
to exchange data among devices and cloud-based systems. Moreover, in M2M commu-
nications, the information collected is used for a specific solution and a specific location,
while in the IoT, information from several locations and devices are managed at the
same time, generating big data and analytics and serving various applications. Despite
these differences, in the IoT, machines communicate in an identical way as in the M2M
scenario. Therefore, securing M2M communications in IoT is the initial step for securing
the entire IoT system. In fact, if machines are not able to securely exchange informa-
tion among themselves and the IoT core, the IoT system or part of it can be easily
compromised.
2.3 Emerging Trends in the IoT
In the following subsections, an overview of emerging trends and extensions of the IoT,
architectural reference models and standards that have been proposed for the IoT are
presented. There are three main trends in the IoT that are influencing its evolution. The
first is an emerging paradigm called the Social Internet of Things (SIoT); the second is
the introduction of the Virtual Continuum (VC) and the last is the introduction of Fog
Computing (FC).
2.3.1 Social Internet of Things (SIoT)
The SIoT paradigm was introduced by Atzori et al. in 2011 and it had a significant
impact in the IoT area. This subdivide the IoT into social structures [139, 140] by
applying the social networks of human beings to the IoT system. The definition of
smart objects is enhanced by adding a social capability which enables objects not only
to manage information in a smart way, but also to create social relationships with other
objects. Each social object can be identified by its owner, a unique ID and a profile.
This paradigm is based only on relationships among things, not among their owners, so
things play a key role in the SIoT system. A representation of the SIoT architecture is
shown in Figure 2.2.
This is a typical client-server architecture, in which the server (SIoT Server) can
communicate with two types of clients, an IoT gateway and a social object. A social
agent is used in servers in order to communicate with the client and other gateways
and/or social objects. The SIoT architecture can be subdivided into different layers
for both server and clients (gateway and object). In terms of the server, there are two
layers:
1. Network layer: manages the physical communication;
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Figure 2.2: SIoT architecture.
2. Application layer: consists of three sub-layers:
• Base sub-layer: data storage and management;
• Component sub-layer: tools for component implementation;
• Interface sub-layer: interfaces with SIoT components (objects, human etc.);
In terms of clients, there can be three layers:
1. Sensing layer: a physical object;
2. Network layer: manages the physical communication;
3. Application layer: this is composed of (i) applications, (ii) a social agent that
manages the communication among objects and the server and (iii) a service man-
agement that provides the interface with humans.
In this scenario, there are new kinds of relationships, as shown in Figure 2.3.
These relationships are:
• Ownership: among objects that belong to the same user;
• Co-work: among objects that collaborate to provide common SIoT services;
• Co-location: among objects that are in the same place;
• Social: among objects that interact with each other;
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work 21
common
community
co-work
parental
co-location
social
co-owner
Ownership Social relationship among objects
Figure 2.3: Types of relationship in the SIoT paradigm.
• Parental: among objects that belong to the same manufacturer.
The main role of the owner of the objects is to register them in the SIoT system
(SIoT Server). Each object is assigned to a specific class according to its features:
• Class 1: mobile objects with large computational and communicational capabili-
ties;
• Class 2: static objects with significant computational and communicational capa-
bilities;
• Class 3: objects with only sensing capabilities;
• Class 4: Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) or Near Field Communication
(NFC)-based objects.
Another role of the owner of the objects is to define policies governing the operations
performed, i.e. what information to share, what relationships are permitted etc.
2.3.2 Virtualisation Continuum (VC)
In the same year that SIoT was introduced, Alam et al. [141] had the idea of introducing
the Virtualisation Continuum (VC) to the IoT. As initially conceived, this involved the
introduction of the IoT virtualisation framework that provides an interface between the
application layer and the real devices. Subsequently, virtual objects were introduced
in the Internet of Things - Architecture (IoT-A) European project; these were called
virtual entities, as highlighted previously in this chapter. A virtual object can represent
many real objects in the Internet, depending on how many functionalities these can
provide. In 2014, the European project Internet Connected Objects for Reconfigurable
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Ecosystem (iCore) [142] introduced into the architectural reference model the virtual
object level, in which many virtual objects can be represented by many real objects.
The VC allows a virtual representation of real objects in the digital world. Each virtual
object provides augmented functionalities of real objects, thereby increasing their com-
putational capabilities, data storage, network connectivity etc. The virtual object will
be able to support different devices independent of the vendor, thereby facilitating the
communication of real objects in the IoT system.
Figure 2.4 shows a possible IoT architecture within the virtualisation layer. The
virtualisation layer has two levels. The first enhances the functionalities of the vir-
tual object by providing authentication, addressing and naming, search and discovery,
and mobility management. The second is the virtualisation specific level, which pro-
vides cognitive management, context awareness and semantic description capabilities.
The virtual objects’ management block provides functionalities related to the creation,
maintenance and coordination, and deletion of virtual objects in the virtualisation layer.
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Figure 2.4: Virtual Continuum in the IoT architecture.
2.3.3 Fog Computing (FC)
In 2012, Cisco Systems [143, 144] introduced the concept of integrating Fog Computing
(FC) into the so-called Internet of Everything (IoE). Cisco defines the IoE as an evolution
of the IoT in which everything can communicate with everything through the Internet.
The FC should help the scalability of the IoE system by decentralizing processes that
do not require information from the Cloud. An important aspect of the Fog is its
role in managing M2M interactions. It collects and processes the data and issues control
commands to the actuators. It also filters the data that needs to be used locally and sends
the rest to the Cloud. This solution aims to allow real-time operations and processing
in M2M interactions. A representation of the FC is shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Fog Computing in the IoE system.
2.4 Information Security and Trust
As highlighted in the introduction and suggested by different organizations and re-
searchers, security has an important role in M2M communications in the IoT. The main
role of information security is to protect the information in a communication system. It
refers to the conjunction of three components: confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Confidentiality and integrity refer to the fact that all the private information must be
protected from access and manipulation by unauthorised users, both internal or exter-
nal. Availability indicates that all information must be accessible to authorised users
during the normal activity of the system. Violations of these components caused by
malicious users are called respectively disclosure (i.e. data poisoning), alteration (i.e.
decryption and cracking) and denial (i.e. Denial of Service (DoS)) [145].
Attacks can be categorised as passive or active and the attacker can be inside or
outside the network. A summary of the potential attacks against wireless networks used
by Internet-connected things is shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Examples of attacks against wireless networks used by Internet-connected
things.
RFID [146]
Physical Layer
Tag and/or reader re-
moval/destruction
Passive and active interfer-
ence
Relay attacks KILL command
Network and
Transport Layer
Tag cloning and spoofing Network protocol attack
Reader impersonation and eavesdropping
Application Layer
Unauthorized tag reading Tag modification
Buffer overflows Malicious code injection
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Multilayer
Covert channel and DoS Traffic analysis
Crypto attacks Side channel attacks
Replay attacks
Wi-Fi [147–152]
Physical Layer
Passive and active scanning
Access Point (AP) removal/
destruction
Radio Frequency jamming attack
Data Link Layer
Association/ Authentication/ Deauthentication/ Disasso-
ciation/ Beacon/ PS Poll/ Clear to Send (CTS)/Request
to Send (RTS) flood
Michael (MIC) shutdown exploitation Temporal Key In-
tegrity Protocol (TKIP) attack
Unauthenticated association Chopchop attack
KoreK attack
Wi-Fi Protected Setup
(WPS) attack
Media Access Control
(MAC) address spoofing
4-Way handshake blocking
Network Layer
802.1X Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Length
Attacks/ 802.1X EAP-of-Death
Ping of Death attack / LAND attack
EAP over LAN (EAPoL)-
Start/Logoff Attack
Internet Protocol (IP)/DNS
spoofing
SYN Flooding attack Smurf attack
Premature EAP Success/-
Failure attack
NULL data attack
Multilayer
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) replay attack
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)/WPA2 four-way hand-
shake - dictionary attack
Rogue AP/Evil Twin Chameleon attack
MITM attack 802.1X RADIUS cracking
ZigBee - IEEE 802.15.4 [153, 154]
Physical Layer
Jamming Eavesdropping
Node tampering Nodes removal/destruction
Data Link Layer
Injection and alteration
DoS and integrity protection
attack on Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES)-CTR
Back off interval manipula-
tion
Guaranteed Time Slot
(GTS) attack
ACK attack PANId conflict
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Denial of sleep
CCMP known plaintext re-
covery
Network Layer
Routing attacks Hello floods
Network flooding attacks Wormhole attack
Compromised nodes on path suppress or alter packets
Transport Layer Desynchronization attack
Application Layer
Overwhelming sensors Path-based DoS attack
Deluge (reprogramming) attack
Multilayer
DoS battery-drainage (if battery is present)
Node replication
Cellular [155–159]
Mobile-Base
Stations
communications
MITM attack in GSM/UMTS scenario
Network bandwidth saturation with fake Channel Quality
Indicator (CQI)/Signalling attack
Mobile Station imperson-
ation
GSM Base Station imperson-
ation
Greedy handoffs attack
Proportional Fair based at-
tack
Transport Layer Dedicated CHannel (DCH) starvation DoS attack
IP Multimedia
Subsystem (IMS)
layer
Routing attacks DNS attacks
DoS attack
Multilayer
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) Battery draining
attacks
Short Message Service (SMS) flooding
Three key issues can be identified in relation to IoT security [160, 161]:
1. Privacy and data confidentiality: only authorised entities can access and modify
data according to defined rules under which data referring to individual users may
be accessed;
2. Security: refers to rules for securing the communication among IoT objects in
order to eliminate network-based threats;
3. Trust: refers to security policies regulating access to critical resources and the
credentials that are required to satisfy these policies.
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2.4.1 Encryption Techniques in the Internet of Things
The aim of using encryption techniques during data transmission is to prevent unau-
thorised access to the information transmitted. Cryptographic algorithms are used to
encrypt this information. Before encryption, this information is called plaintext; af-
ter encryption it is called ciphertext. There are two main layers in which encryption
techniques are used in the IoT [162, 163]:
1. Network layer : a by-hop encryption mechanism is used to provide an encrypted
network link among nodes. An example of link encryption for a Wi-Fi network is
the Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) based on the AES;
2. Application layer : an end-to-end encryption mechanism is used to provide en-
crypted information. The most common cryptographic protocol used in the In-
ternet for encrypting data at this layer is the Transport Layer Security/Secure
Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL).
Encryption at the network layer is commonly based on a symmetric encryption, in
which all nodes in the network use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the link, usually
called a pre-shared key. If only the network layer encryption is used, nodes inside the
network can read the plaintext. Commonly used to protect information from outsiders,
this method is used only when all nodes in the network are trustworthy.
Encryption at the application layer is commonly based on an asymmetric/public-key
cryptographic algorithm. This consists of different keys, called a private/public key pair,
for encrypting and decrypting the information. In particular, each node in the network
has a private key, which is known only by that node, and a public key, which can be
seen by all the other nodes and is correlated to the private key. The main aspect is that
nodes can obtain the public key of a node but not its private key. The most well-known
asymmetric algorithm is RSA based on a factorisation problem.
A simplified explanation of this is as follows. A node in the network, “A”, selects
two large prime numbers, p and q, with p 6= q. It will then calculate the product of these
prime numbers (n), which will be the common factor between the private and public
keys. Furthermore, it will calculate the Euler totient function as:
φ (n) = (p− 1) (q − 1) (2.1)
Next, “A” will select an integer (e) that is relatively prime to the result obtained by the
Euler totient function and is less than that result, as:
gcd (φ (n) , e) = 1; 1 < e < φ (n) (2.2)
Finally, “A” will determine a value d such that d ≡ e−1 (mod φ (n)). Therefore, “A”
will have as its private key a pair obtained by d and n (APRk = {d, n}) and as its
public key a pair obtained by e and n (APUk = {e, n}). At this point, a node “B” that
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would like to securely communicate with “A” will retrieve APUk , encrypt a randomly
generated key (K ) by calculating C = Ke modn and send it to “A”. “A” can use APRk
for decrypting C by calculating K = Cd modn. At this point, “A” and “B” can use K
as shared key to symmetrically encrypt the information exchanged [164, 165].
This type of encryption can be subject to a so-called MITM attack in which an
attacker node is between the communication of two nodes during the key exchange
process. This attack is shown in Figure 2.6 and allows the attacker to eavesdrop, inject
or alter the information exchanged.
Figure 2.6: An MITM attack against RSA.
This attack can be overcome by using digital signatures or keyed hash functions.
These mechanisms are used to provide proof of the origin of the message and its integrity
in order to protect the message against forgery. Commonly, the digital signature is
created by using the private key and the message. Therefore, as the private key is
correlated to the public key, only the real owner of the public key can generate the
signature of the message. The receiver of the message must know in advance the public
key of the sender to properly verify the authenticity of the message and the signature,
otherwise a different type of MITM attack can be perpetrated. This does not solve the
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problem of associating a specific key to a specific individual, however. All it confirms is
that the message is signed by that specific entity in the network.
This problem can be overcome by using trusted third parties such as Certification
Authorities (CAs). The role of CAs is to provide digital signed certificates in order to
associate the identity of an entity to its public key. For each entity to validate the public
key with the digital signed certificate, the public key of the CA must be known, accepted
and trusted. This will reduce the number of known public keys to be stored. A node
sends its public key with the certificate and the receiver uses the CA public key to verify
its authenticity.
These encryption mechanisms present some issues. First, they may require dedi-
cated processors for encrypting and decrypting information and are therefore time- and
power-consuming. Second, they can lead to attacks to retrieve the private key for de-
crypting the information. These performance issues are compounded in embedded sys-
tems at the base of IoT devices. Authors in [166–169] proposed a solution to these issues.
This solution uses a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) that is a challenge-response
mechanism. In this, a specific challenge is mapped with a unique and specific response
dependent on the physical material. The same challenge given in input to two differ-
ent materials will produce to a different and unique response from each of them. The
uniqueness is based on physical variabilities in the hardware components introduced
during the manufacturing process. This makes the behaviour of each component unique
and difficult to predict, leading to unclonable results. A PUF is a low-power, high-speed
and low-cost solution. This can be used as a cryptographic mechanism in which the
public key is called Public PUF (PPUF) and the private key is generated by the PUF
itself.
For example, the PPUF (public key) of a node “A” is a set of well-known
challenge-response pairs of its PUF. Node “B”, which has the PPUF of “A” and would
like to communicate with it, will challenge “A” by using a challenge in “A”’s PPUF. “A”
will give the challenge in input to the PUF (private key), and its response will be sent
back to “B”. “B” can then verify “A”’s authenticity by comparing the obtained response
with the response in “A”’s PPUF. If the responses match, “A” will be authenticated
and marked as legitimate, otherwise the authentication will fail. It is clear that while
this solution can be easily implemented, it requires that each node in the network has
the PPUF of other nodes, otherwise MITM attacks can be performed using a similar
pathway to that shown in Figure 2.6. A possible solution is to use trusted third parties
with a database of PPUFs for each node in the network containing a large number of
challenge-response pairs for each node. This does not solve the problem completely,
however, as the trusted third parties must be trusted by using certificates.
Nodes using encryption only at the application layer can exchange information de-
pending on application-based policies. If only this method of encryption is used, nodes
can exchange information in unencrypted links, but this cannot hide the data traffic and
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metadata. In particular, the source and destination addresses can be clearly identified,
and can be used by malicious attackers to characterise the communication.
There are several limiting factors in relation to applying encryption techniques to
the IoT and specifically with embedded objects. Network encryption can be used if
nodes in the network are trustworthy, which is not always the case in IoT scenarios.
For example, network encryption can be applied to controlled environments in which
objects are owned by the same person/company, but its application is not feasible in
public environments in which objects have different owners and link encryption is not
feasible.
The application of digital signatures, certificates and/or PUF requires object to store
known public keys/PPUFs of nodes and/or CAs’ certificates. The certification process
is time consuming and it is costly to certify the large number of objects in the IoT. Cer-
tificates also have an expiration date, which necessitates a constant update of objects’
keys. This would lead to a large number of certificates, which would limit their applica-
tions into embedded objects with limited memory resources. Embedded objects using
certificates must also have additional mechanisms to protect stored keys from malicious
attackers. Moreover, a specific crypto-processor should be present in embedded objects
with limited processing capabilities, to support encryption and decryption techniques
when PUF are not used. A trusted third party is one point of failure, as if it is com-
promised, the entire network is also compromised. Digital signatures or certificates are
not suitable for IoT-embedded things because of the large computational overheads and
the low scalability of this method to billions of objects. Therefore, it is infeasible to
apply these techniques to identify which objects belong to the IoT network, especially
in uncontrolled and unmanaged environments.
Finally, authors in [170, 171] argued that authentication methods based on encryp-
tion only provide a binary authentication (i.e. accepted or not) and therefore are not
suitable for distributed systems, plus they have scalability issues. Another issue with
using these methods is that compromised nodes can actively be used to compromise the
network. Selfish nodes could also take advantage of such mechanisms to disrupt the
network. These authors highlight the importance of using trust instead of relying only
on encryption techniques to give a full authorisation to the system.
2.4.2 Definition of Trust
Trust is a primary factor for securing future communications and it should be adopted
as a standard. There is no unique definition of trust. Commonly, the word trust is
associated with the Internet-based authentication method used to access secure servers.
This method is based mainly on trust certificates provided by trusted CAs worldwide.
Nevertheless, the fact that someone uses the correct trusted certificate does not actually
mean that it is reliable a priori. In fact, an attacker can use the correct certificate, but
at the same time can misbehave, perpetrating attacks against the system.
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According to dictionary.com, “trust” is defined as the “reliance on the integrity,
strength, ability, surety, etc., of a person or thing” [172]. The Merriam-Webster Dic-
tionary defines trust as “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of
someone or something” [173]. This thesis adopts the definition of trust presented in [99]:
“the belief that another party will behave according to a set of well-established rules and
thus meet one’s expectations”. Trust can be also represented as a triad of three opinions
belief, disbelief and uncertainty, which indicate the probability of trusting or distrusting
an entity and the probability of doubt about whether to trust an entity [174]. Figure
2.7 shows the corresponding triads for information security and trust.
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Figure 2.7: Summary of information security and trust triads, showing CIA and DAD
triads for information security on the right and trust opinions triad on the left.
The definition of trust derives from the Human-to-Human (H2H) trust definition
and is then applied to M2M communications. As in human societies, in a network there
are several ways to create trusted relationships among entities. A trust relationship can
be viewed as a set of characteristics about the relationship which is used to define how
to trust another party. In a trust relationship there is an entity, called trustor or agent,
which can create trust by providing a service to another entity, called the trustee. A
trustee that is perceived as highly reliable by the trustor is called a trustworthy entity
[175].
There are four ways to create trust relationships [175]:
i one-to-one: a relationship between two nodes,
ii one-to-many,
iii many-to-one: relationship between one node and a group of nodes and viceversa and
iv many-to-many: relationship between one group and another group of nodes.
There are also certain properties that a trust relationship has, such as reflexivity,
subjectivity, asymmetry, transitivity, context relativity, measurability, uncertainty, dy-
namism and time-ageing [176–180]. Trust is primarily reflexive, as each entity trusts
itself. Subjectivity refers to the fact that different parties can have different trust opin-
ions about the same context. Asymmetry describes the scenario in which a node A trusts
another node B, but this does not mean that B automatically trusts A. Transitivity is
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when a node A trusts B and B trusts another node C, but because trust typically is not
transitive, this does not necessarily mean that A trusts C. Typically a node A trusts
another node B within a specific context or related to a specific environment; this is
called context relativity. Measurability refers to the ability to specify the degree of trust
one node has in another based on its assessment of the honesty, competence and depend-
ability of the other node. When a node is not sure whether to trust another node, there
is an uncertainty area that prevents the trustor from trusting or distrusting the trustee.
Trust is dynamic and strictly dependent on the timing factor. In fact, a node A can
trust another node B to a certain degree at a specific time, but this degree can change
to uncertainty or distrust at another specific time. Finally, the trust is time-ageing, as
its value decreases with the passage of time.
Trust relationships can also be defined using mathematical notations [181–183]. A
relationship between an entity A and an entity B (A→ B) can be defined as TA,B with
T ∈ [0, 1]. The properties of trust relationships can therefore be defined as follows:
• Reflexivity: ∀A|G(TA,A = 1) where Gx means always x;
• Subjectivity: ∃TαA , TαB | (∃TαA ; ∃TαB) where α is the context in which parties are
creating their trust opinions;
• Asymmetry: ∃A,B| (∃TA,B ; ∃TB,A);
• Transitivity: ∃TA,B, TB,C ∧ @TA,C ∪ ∃P (A,B,C) where P (A,B,C) is the trust
path defined by the trust relationship between A and C through B. TA,C = RB ·
TA,B if there is only one B, otherwise TA,C =
1
n
∑i=1
n RBi · TA,Bi , where RB is B
recommendation trust value of C. These are valid only if B has some knowledge
about C (TB,C 6= 0) and A has some knowledge about B (RB 6= 0);
• Context relativity: ∃T ciA,B ; ∃T
cj
A,B where ci is the context i, cj is the context j
and i 6= j;
• Dynamic: (TA,B)new Q (TA,B)old , µ Q (TA,B)old where µ is the latest trust level;
• Time-ageing: ∀ci
((
T ciA,B
)
t
>
(
T ciA,B
)
t+∆t
)
where ci is the context i and i =
1, ..., k.
2.4.3 Trust Management Frameworks
In order to collect information and to create and maintain trust relationships, a Trust
Management Framework (TMF) is adopted. Blaze et al. [184] defined a TMF as a system
based on a unified mechanism in which policies, credentials and trust relationships can
be used in an algorithm to manage the security of the network. Jøsang et al. [185] used
a more elaborate definition of TMF. Their TMF creates systems and methods that allow
to entities in the network to decide and assess other parties on a specific critical subject.
This also permits parties and their owners to specify their own reliability and that of
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their systems. At the basis of a TMF there is a trust computation, through which trust
is mathematically evaluated in a way that can be used by machines in the network.
Trust computations can be subdivided into five main parts, as described below.
Trust Composition
At the core of the trust computation, there are several components that can be used to
create trust, usually called trust metrics. A trust metric is specific information gath-
ered from the observation of the behaviours of entities that is used to determine how
one entity can trust another entity. An example of a trust metric is the Quality of
Service (QoS) trust, which refers to the belief that an entity will deliver a service to
a specified standard. In the IoT, authors in [186–192] measures the QoS trust using
competence, cooperativeness, reliability, end-to-end packet forwarding, packet delivery
ratio etc. Building on this approach, authors in [188–193] introduced the Social Trust
(ST) metric in the SIoT.
The ST includes:
• Friendship: representing the degree of intimacy;
• Honesty: indicating if an entity is honest;
• Cooperativeness: denoting if an entity is socially cooperative;
• Connectivity: specifying the network connection with an entity;
• Social contact: representing proximity;
• Community of Interest (CoI): in this scenario, the trustor and trustee are in the
same social communities/groups or have similar capabilities, such as the same
knowledge of and standards in relation to a specific subject.
Trust Propagation
There are two different ways to propagate trust in a TMF: centralised and decentralised.
In the first, trust relationships among entities are maintained and provided by a central
entity, whereas in the second, each entity creates and maintains trust information about
other entities [194, 195].
Trust Aggregation
In a TMF, trust aggregation is the method of combining trust information, which is
collected in three ways: (i) direct observation, (ii) indirect observation or (iii) through
recommendations. Direct trust is established by an entity through direct observation
of another entity; indirect trust is established when one entity trusts another entity
without directly observing it. In the case of three entities that can see each other, the
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trustor can use the recommendations (direct observations) of other entities to trust a
third entity.
A summary of these ways of collecting trust information in a network with the entity
A as a trustor is shown in Figure 2.8. In this figure, A trusts the entity B on the basis of
direct observations and C’s recommendations, while A trusts D on the basis of indirect
observations from B. Obviously, in order to use C’s recommendations for trusting B,
A must first evaluate the trustworthiness of C by using its direct observations and B’s
recommendations.
Indirect observationDirect observation Recommendation
A
C
D
B
A
C
D
B
A
C
D
B
A,BT A,D       A,B      B,DT   = T     T.
A,D       A,BT   < T
A,B         A,C      C,BT    = T     T.R
Figure 2.8: Examples of trust aggregation with the node A as a trustor.
There are different approaches presented in the literature to aggregating trust, includ-
ing weighted sum, evidence theory, probabilistic estimation, information theory, game
theory, fuzzy logic and grey theory [196–198]. As is evident from the discussion thus
far, trust aggregation is strictly dependent on the network topology. In fact, depending
on the network topology, some ways to collect information may not be available. For
example, in a linear topology, a trustor will be unable to use recommendations as there
will be no common neighbour entities.
Trust Update
The trust value of an entity can be updated in two different ways: event-driven and
time-driven. In the first method, the trust value is updated after a specific event occurs,
whereas in the second method, the value changes depending on the time. Usually in
a time-driven TMF, recent information about an entity is more important than past
information [199].
Trust Formation
Trust formation is the last step in evaluating trust in a relationship. Two aspects are
described in the literature; single-trust and multi-trust. In a single-trust TMF, a unique
trust value is used to create trust relationships, e.g. only QoS trust. In a multi-trust
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TMF, multiple trust values are used simultaneously for creating trust relationships [199].
In this case, these trust values can be used in three ways:
• One-by-one: each trust value is compared with a threshold value depending on the
application;
• Weighted sum: all trust values are summed by applying a weight factor to each
one depending on its importance;
• Scaled trust: the trust values are scaled from the most to the least important
property.
2.4.4 Attacks against Trust Management Frameworks
As with every networking-based system, TMFs may be vulnerable to several attacks,
called misbehaviour attacks, that can be carried out by malicious entities [186, 189, 190,
200]:
• Selfish misbehaviour attack: the entity preserves its resources by claiming to offer
some services without really providing them;
• On-Off Attack (OOA): an attacker behaves alternately well and badly for a period
of time;
• Selective behaviour attack: an entity can behave well when providing some services
and badly when providing others;
• Selective misbehaviour attack: the malevolent entity behaves well towards some
important entities and bad towards other, less important entities;
• Self-Promoting Attack (SPA): an attacker promotes itself by projecting a good
reputation in order to be used as service provider and then may provide bad
services or may block service requests;
• Bad-Mouthing Attack (BMA): a malicious entity provides bad recommendations
of other, well-trusted entities in order to reduce their trustworthiness;
• Ballot-Stuffing Attack (BSA) or Good-Mouthing Attack (GMA): the attacker in-
creases the reputation of malicious entities in order to augment their trustworthi-
ness;
• Opportunistic Service Attack (OSA): an attacker begins to provide good services
to improve its reputation opportunistically, especially if its reputation is low;
• Conflicting behaviour attack: an entity behaves well with a group of entities and
badly with another group;
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• Sybil attack: the malicious entity creates multiple false identities and use them to
manipulate the reputation of other entities;
• Newcomer or whitewashing attack: the attacker leaves the network and re-joins
with a new identity in order to reset its reputation;
• Masquerade attack: an entity changes its identity to that of another entity (im-
personation theft) and then uses its reputation (reputation theft) to behave badly.
2.4.5 Trust Models for IoT
Below, the main TMFs for the IoT proposed in the literature are listed. These are
subdivided by following the trust propagation:
• Centralised. Saied et al. [186] proposed a TMF based on QoS and context-aware
information such as service type and device capabilities (processing power, memory
and battery level) for the trust composition. The central trust manager stores all
the reputation reports sent by entities after a service is provided. When an entity
requests a specific service, the central trust manager gives information about those
trusted entities that can provide it;
• Distributed. D. Chen et al. [187], Z. Chen et al. [188], I-R Chen et al. and Bao et
al. [189–192] proposed different approaches to distributed TMFs. Authors in [187]
use QoS elements, such as end-to-end packet forwarding ratio, energy consumption
and packet delivery ratio, as the trust metric, while authors in [188–192] use both
QoS and ST metrics and relationships between IoT devices;
• Centralised and distributed. Nitti et al. [193] proposed a TMF based on QoS and
ST as trust metrics.
Authors in [187] proposed the first TMF for IoT which adopted a fuzzy reputation
mechanism to evaluate trust in the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) of IoT systems.
This is based on enforcing cooperation among entities and by checking their behaviours.
They suggest that in IoT there will be smart nodes with resource constraints in terms
of hardware, computation and power capabilities and a limited range of communica-
tion for wireless nodes. For wireless nodes specifically, they underscored the need to
study mobility, dynamic topologies and limited physical security. Bao et al. [201] kept
working in this direction, but they adopted a hierarchical TMF based on QoS in WSN.
Consequently, in [189], authors suggested the first work in TMF for SIoT in which the
trustworthiness of users is used to assist the service composition between objects. This
is based on QoS and ST metrics. The same group of [189] adopted an enhanced TMF
which considered mobility and evolving of environment conditions in the network such
as increasing of nodes and attackers [190]. Moreover, they began to consider CoI of
SIoT systems, and authors in [191] proposed the first TMF for this paradigm. In [192],
authors considered a user-centric solution based on the SIoT paradigm, in which users
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are the trustors and the devices owned by other users are the trustees. All the solu-
tions proposed until [186] are based only on distributed TMF. In fact, authors of this
last work proposed the first centralised TMF for IoT based on QoS as the trust metric.
They underline the importance of considering the characteristics of the object during the
trust evaluation, such as processing power, memory and battery capabilities [186]. Nitti
et al. [193] suggested the first solution in which both centralised and distributed TMFs
are used and applied to SIoT. In this solution, each node maintains the trust value of
other objects. At the same time, a central Pre-Trusted Object (PTO) stores feedbacks
from each node in the network and these are used as recommendations by objects in
the network. Finally, authors in [188] proposed another TMF based on SIoT. They
highlighted the necessity of using trust values obtained from the object’s capabilities,
e.g. a sensor will have a lower trust value than a laptop etc. A summary of proposed
TMFs for IoT is shown in Table 2.3.
2.5 Limitations of Current Solutions
The works discussed in the previous section represent an important starting point in
trust management for the IoT, however there are some issues that limit their applicabil-
ity. First, a major assumption is made in [187, 190, 201]. In these works, each node in
promiscuous mode in the network can overhear the traffic of its neighbours and there-
fore can understand if they are actively forwarding the packets. The disadvantage of
detecting suspicious activities by snooping or overhearing a neighbour’s transmission is
that the nodes should keep track of every packet snooped to make sure that it was not
modified during the transit. This is an additional load, especially for battery-powered
devices. Moreover, node movements and node crashes will have a detrimental effect on
the system by affecting the flow of traffic, and thereby leading to false alarms. This
results in innocent nodes being mistakenly detected as intruders [202]. These works
consider only a specific IoT environment consisting of wireless sensors with a QoS trust
metric only (packet forwarding/delivery ratio and power consumption).
A second issue is that in some works [189, 190], only static environments are consid-
ered and thus the results are not applicable to many IoT applications in which environ-
mental conditions are evolving. Moreover, the scalability issue has not being addressed,
which hinders the applicability of this research to large-scale IoT systems.
A further assumption is made in [201], in which a hierarchical trust management for
WSNs is proposed. It is based on Sensor Nodes, Cluster Heads and Base Station (BS).
The BS is a Cluster Head commander and it is assumed to be infallible with physical
protection. However, this assumption is not realistic in real environments and if the BS
is compromised, the entire system will be compromised as well.
In addition, objects in [188–191, 193] use internal storage to save trust values and
information about other entities in the network. In these, past and new events are
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stored. If the network increases rapidly, this can be problematic for embedded devices
with constrained resources, e.g. limited memory storage.
Another work that is based on two major assumptions is proposed by authors in
[186]. First, during network initialization, all entities are assumed to be trusted and
behaving properly. Second, it is assumed that entities cannot dynamically join and
leave the network, in other words, that the topology is fixed. These assumptions are not
realistic in an actual IoT environment in which network formations are dynamic and
entities can join and leave the network at any time. Moreover, a centralised TMF is
proposed, which creates a unique point of failure. This means that if the central entity
is subverted, the entire network will be compromised.
The scope in [188] is to provide a QoS to end-users who own customised and spe-
cialised devices. An entity that requests a service will broadcast its request in the
network, leading to network congestion if there are a lot of malicious devices or requests
at the same time.
An equally important issue is evident in [193], whose authors introduced PTOs
(Pre-Trusted Objects) as part of the TMF. The role of PTOs is to maintain the trust
values of the entities in the network. However, an attacker can obtain its trust value
from a PTO and change its behaviours accordingly. Moreover, if an attacker successfully
impersonates a PTO, this can create false trust value entries, enabling it to attack entities
in the network.
Table 2.4 shows a summary of gaps, major assumptions and other issues in the TMFs
proposed in the literature for the IoT. It may be observed that none of them consider
how to protect the TMF from On-Off Attacks (OOAs). Moreover, they do not consider
worst case scenarios with linear topologies and virtual and emulated systems that can
pretend to be real devices with different capabilities.
Most of the TMFs proposed in the literature do not consider attacks against the
network communication, but only those against the TMF itself. A lot of basic assump-
tions are made to develop new TMFs. However, it is not possible to apply these in real
IoT systems based on M2M communications, as these may include resource-constrained
devices and have different network topologies. Moreover, no work has been done thus far
where different trust metrics are combined; for example, a trust metric may be effective
and efficient in Wi-Fi networks, but it will fail when applied in ZigBee networks [203].
Finally, these works do not address whether to distrust forged objects such as fake OSs,
fake capabilities, etc. This issue allows attackers to use these forged objects to gain the
trust of the TMF and hence to attack other nodes.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter an introduction to IoT was presented by looking at its evolution in terms
of Internet-connected machines and architectural reference models. An introduction to
M2M communications was also presented in conjunction with architectural reference
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models for IoT/M2M. Subsequently, emerging trends in IoT were shown. An overview
of information security and trust was presented specifically in relation to TMFs for IoT.
The limitations of current proposals to secure the IoT were highlighted.
It is important to note that the already high number of Internet-connected things
that will manage our lives is growing, and that these things must be secured. As can be
seen, having no standard architectural reference model within which to build security
functionalities is a major problem. This is compounded by the continuous evolution
of the IoT in that these models are changing, mainly guided by the current needs and
objectives.
However, some architectural reference models incorporate trust for securing the com-
munication of things. Trust is used by things to identify misbehaving machines in the
network that do not follow rules honestly and most importantly do not need human help.
After defining which information can be used to obtain trust values from the behaviour
of these machines, it will be easy to determine whether a node is trustworthy or not.
By evaluating these trust values, a measurement of the trustworthiness, reliability, and
capacity of individual entities can be calculated based on previous, direct and indirect
observations, and recommendations about their behaviours.
The continuous evolution of the IoT without a unique standard for managing M2M
communications makes the creation of a TMF a very challenging task. Machines that
look to compromise trust can perform various attacks against the TMF. Therefore, a
context-aware approach must be used that considers the characteristics and computa-
tional limitations of an IoT “thing”. The smartness of a thing must be improved by
adding the ability to create trust relationships with other things, and IoT mobile agents
could be fundamental in this role.
As highlighted previously, there are currently no complete solutions that can be
applied in the real IoT environment. Some works on TMFs for IoT discussed in this thesis
are focused only on a specific IoT paradigm, the SIoT, which limits their applicability.
In this new paradigm a scenario in which the owner of an object is a company is not
considered, making social relationships more difficult to apply in business-to-business
applications. Moreover, this paradigm relies on the owner of the object assigning the
object to the correct class representing its features, but an attacker may insert false
information in order to take some advantage from the system. Finally, the owner of
the object must define what relationships are allowed with other objects owned by
other humans, therefore trust relationships among owners must be considered. In this
situation, whether the owner of the object trusts other owners will affect whether his/her
object trusts other objects.
Another problem that we face today is the growth of proprietary objects. These will
be more difficult to integrate into an IoT system. Security is, unfortunately, the last
aspect that is currently considered when creating these objects, meaning that attacks
against them are easy and constantly increasing.
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In the next chapter a new threat against the IoT system and specifically against
M2M devices is presented. This attack can be used to subvert a network and obtain
private information. An initial method for detecting and protecting a machine from this
type of attack is also proposed.

Chapter 3
A New Threat and a Novel
Solution: Machine Emulation
Detection Algorithm
In this chapter, a new threat against M2M communications in the IoT is presented.
This threat is based on using virtualised and emulated embedded systems for attacking
the network or part of it. As shown in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5), current TMFs are not
able to distrust forged objects, therefore they cannot recognise if a machine is based on
a virtualised or emulated system. This attack is then applied to the real-life scenarios
presented in the introduction (Chapter 1), in order to highlight the system vulnera-
bilities and to show what could happen if this attack is not detected and prevented.
Existing works on detecting virtual and emulated embedded systems are shown later
in this chapter. It is shown that these cannot be used in IoT/M2M communications.
In this context, a novel solution is presented and evaluated, called Machine Emulation
Detection Algorithm (MEDA). This solution was published by Valerio Selis and Alan
Marshall as ‘MEDA: a Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm’ in Proceedings of the
12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2015) [6].
3.1 Threat Model
Currently, an IoT-embedded object can use two main types of communications to ex-
change information with other objects, the Internet and the end user:
• Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication;
• Machine-to-Human (M2H) communication.
These can be subverted by an attacker in order to create two types of communications:
• Machine-to-Fake Machine (M2FM) communication, and vice versa;
• Machine-to-Fake Human (M2FH) communication, and vice versa, where a fake
human is a machine that is able to mimic the behaviours of humans.
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This thesis focuses on M2FM communications.
Currently, an IoT-embedded object communicates with other embedded objects in
the network on the assumption that these objects are real embedded machines (REMs).
Therefore, M2FM communications are not considered at all in current research works.
Of the works present in the literature focused on integrating trust mechanisms in the
IoT, some underlined the importance of trusting embedded systems in a different way.
These works use the characteristics of an object to weight their trust values as part of
the trust computation, as shown in Table 3.1 [186, 188, 193, 204].
Table 3.1: Assigned trust weight values of published works, according to the compu-
tational capabilities of machines.
Device Trust weight value
RFID 0.2 [193, 204]
Device
resources in
percentage
(0 to 100%)
[186] 1
Sensor 0.2 [188, 193], 0.4 [204]
Recorder 0.2 [188]
Set-top box 0.4 [188], 0.6 [204], 0.8 [193]
Smart video camera 0.4 [188], 0.6 [204]
Smart gateway and terminal 0.6 [188]
Smartphone and tablet 0.8 [188, 193, 204]
Laptop 0.8 [188]
However, a potential attacker may create M2FM communications by using virtualised
and emulated embedded systems. Thus, multiple forged objects can be simply created
with a powerful machine. Moreover, as Table 3.1 suggests, it will probably choose to
forge smartphones, tablets and/or laptops, because of the high initial trust weight value
assigned to these objects. This does not stop an attacker from also using REMs to create
M2FM communications, but this is outside the scope of this thesis as existent TMFs
can be used to detect them.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a threat model in which multiple virtualised or emu-
lated embedded systems are used to compromise the M2M communication. In this case,
the real embedded object (A) will presume that it is creating an M2M communication
with other “real” embedded objects (B, C and D). These allow access to the Internet via
another real embedded object (E), as shown in Figure 3.1(a). The attacker uses a pow-
erful machine to forge “B”, “C” and “D” in order to create an M2FM communication,
as in Figure 3.1(b). This may lead to security issues in the communication, especially
for the data transmitted by “A” to the Internet via the attacker(s). After the attacker
successfully established the M2FM communication, it may begin to collect “A”’s data
and to send to “A” false recommendations about “E”.
1N.B. [186] uses the percentage of device resources for creating trust relationships rather than a
specific trust weight value depending on the device type.
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Figure 3.1 shows only an example of this threat, however; in fact, an attacker can
create a large number of forged embedded objects with which to attack the TMF. By
doing this, multiple forged embedded objects are able to attack the TMF and then the
IoT network simultaneously by launching several misbehaviour attacks, as highlighted
in Chapter 2 (Subsection 2.4.4). These can also send false information to “A” and/or
poison the information it sends or receives. For example, nodes “B” and “C” can increase
their reputations by sending good recommendations about each other to “A”, therefore
making “A” more prone to trust them.
A
R-HW
OS
App
E
R-HW
OS
App
Forged Embedded Machines
R-HW
B
OS
App
V-HW
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App
V-HW
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Figure 3.1: Threat model with a representation of multiple forged embedded machines
attacking the IoT in order to create M2FM communications. (a) A’s view of the
network, from which there are apparently no issues. (b) The actual network topology,
including the attacker forging B, C and D.
3.2 Real-Life Scenarios: Worst Cases
At the moment, there are several virtual and/or emulated embedded systems (VESs)
available, such as VMware Player and ESXi, VirtualBox, VirtualPC, QEMU etc., that
can be used by an attacker to create multiple forged objects. As shown in Table 1.2 in
Chapter 1, there are 169,671 servers on-line that use VMware ESXi. This virtualisation
system is a hypervisor that runs Virtual Machines (VMs) directly on the hardware with-
out relying on an OS. Each VMware ESXi server can run simultaneously a maximum
of 1,016 VMs by providing enhanced computational capabilities in respect of VMs run-
ning on top of an OS [205]. A possible attacker that uses all the VMware ESXi servers
available on-line may be able to create around 172 million forged embedded objects.
This number indicates a very high risk for the IoT infrastructure in the event that these
servers are compromised and used as an IoT botnet. An attacker using this large number
of forged embedded objects can launch a distributed attack simultaneously in several
places. For example, in the ITS application an attacker could disrupt the road safety of
an entire city, county or nation, with catastrophic economic impacts and loss of human
life. This could be achieved simply by creating forged vehicles by feeding information
into the ITS and ultimately causing chaos, i.e. real accidents, busy roads etc. Currently,
it is not possible to detect such an attack, leading to a high security risk for the IoT
system, as will be envisioned in the follow subsections.
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It also must be acknowledged that some attackers are not driven by a desire to profit
from the attack, but only by the fact that they can do it, in other words, by the pursuit
of personal gratification, increasing the security risk to such a powerful system.
This powerful attack is strictly dependent on the IoT scenario and on the information
the attacker can gather from the network. Moreover, the number of forged embedded
systems can change according to the scenario and this information. There are two main
categories of IoT scenarios in which an attack can occur: open or public networks and
closed or private networks. These are presented in the following subsections and applied
to real-life scenarios.
3.2.1 Open Networks
In this category, IoT objects can freely join and leave the network. Network encryptions
are not used to encrypt/decrypt the communication link leading to all objects in order
to see the traffic. Objects are also difficult to identify as a large number of them can
be present in different areas at the same time and they can move across areas. In
these real-life scenarios an attacker can easily create and masquerade multiple forged
embedded machines in order to attack the IoT system. In fact, it would be very difficult
to identify this kind of attack, especially in crowded areas. For example, real IoT
applications that can be easily attacked are the ITS and, in specific circumstances, the
IHS.
Intelligent Transportation Systems
In subsection 1.2.1, three possible future scenarios involving the ITS were presented,
using a vehicle as an example: in the first, it is used to improve navigation, in the
second, to improve road safety and in the third to improve passenger entertainment.
In the first scenario, vehicles communicate with the ITS and other vehicles in order
to calculate the fastest route. In this scenario, an attacker that aims to disrupt the
traffic can create a large number of forged vehicles in order to send fake information,
such as detail of an accident that has not happened, false traffic information etc., to
both the ITS and other vehicles. In response, the ITS will suggest alternative routes
to other vehicles, adjust traffic signals to reduce the traffic on what appears to be the
busiest road where in fact the attacker is, etc. In the meantime, other vehicles will avoid
using the attacker’s route, because it appears to be the worst and slowest route to be
used to reach their destination.
In the second scenario, the ITS receives information from vehicles and humans-owned
objects and sends recommendations to users for improving their road safety. In this
scenario, an attacker that aims to disrupt the safety of users can forge a large number
of vehicles and objects to send fake information to the ITS. These forged objects can
send fake positions to the ITS and automatically it will alert vehicles to stop or decrease
their speed because a human is crossing the street. Moreover, forged vehicles can send
fake accident information to the ITS that will react by alerting emergency services.
Chapter 3. A New Threat and a Novel Solution - Machine Emulation Detection
Algorithm 47
Furthermore, in case of a real accident, forged vehicles can send false information to the
ITS in order to lower the reputation of the involved vehicles, thereby preventing and
therefore avoiding emergency services from being alerted.
In the final scenario, vehicles communicate with each other in order to improve the
Internet connectivity for downloading entertainment content such as film, music etc,
and adjusting audio and luminosity levels in the vehicle. An attacker can use forged
vehicles to act as an intermediate node between the Internet and the victim vehicle. It
can then inject a varying amount of fake information depending on the speed of the
vehicle, in order to misrepresent what the users in the vehicle under attack are watching
or listening to. In the case of music streaming, the attacker would need to inject only
a few inappropriate audio samples at a high volume to distract the user from driving,
possibly causing an accident.
Intelligent Healthcare Systems
In subsection 1.2.2, future scenarios involving the IHS were presented in which sensible
human information was used to improve humans’ health. Two main possible future
scenarios can be attached: alerting first aid services and spreading new diseases using
smart body sensors. In these scenarios, an attacker forges smart body sensors and send
fake information to the IHS, such as false human temperature, false heart rate and false
position, with the aim of alerting the nearest ambulance for provide assistance to a
subject that does not require it. Moreover, by using a large number of forged smart
body sensors, the attacker could replicate the severe symptoms caused by a pathogen
in the population of certain areas. When received by the IHS, this information will
be interpreted as the spreading of an infectious disease in these areas and competent
authorities will be alerted, causing an escalation of other issues such as alerting residents
in these areas to stay at home, alerting hospitals to get ready for a crisis, causing panic
in the population etc. These attacks can be perpetrated only if the forged body sensors
are connected to the open IoT network. In fact, real body sensors of patients that are
under critical conditions are likely to be connected to closed home networks in order to
access the IoT core.
3.2.2 Closed Networks
In this category, IoT objects are normally registered in a controlled central system. In
this, encryption mechanisms may be applied, and the number of nodes is mostly known.
Therefore, in order to communicate with other nodes, the attacker would need to attack
encryption mechanisms. As the network is mostly known by the administrator, a small
number of forged embedded machines should be used for launching the attack. Moreover,
it may be necessary to attack the network encryption in order to encrypt/decrypt the
communication link. It may also be necessary to tamper with objects in order to retrieve
encryption keys for encrypting/decrypting the communication at the application layer.
Depending on the type of environment, a large number of unknown (forged) embedded
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machines appearing in the network may trigger an alarm, warning that the network is
under attack. A real IoT application with a closed network that can be attacked is the
IBS.
Intelligent Building Systems
In subsection 1.2.3, future scenarios involving the IBS were presented that included
improving the energy consumption, building occupancy and entertainment of humans
and protecting them in case of fire or other emergencies.
In the first and the second scenarios, the location of users and smart building sensors
can be used, for example, to reduce the energy consumption in unused building areas. In
this situation, after breaking the encryption, an attacker can use forged human devices
to send fake positions or forged smart movement sensors to provide false information to
the IBS. The IBS will adjust the room conditions in terms of luminosity, temperature
etc., on the assumption that there are people in the room. Moreover, the attacker can
also replicate a busy area in the building in order to concentrate people in specific areas.
The IBS will then alert all people to avoid that area if possible by suggesting alternative
areas.
In the third scenario, after breaking the encryption, an attacker uses forged smart
building sensors and human devices to send false requests for accessing to the enter-
tainment system in the building managed by the IBS. The IBS will then turn on the
entertainment system, adjust luminosity level in the room etc., although no person is
present to use the entertainment system.
In another scenario, after breaking the encryption, an attacker uses forged smart
building sensors to indicate the presence of a fire to the IBS. This will alert the nearest
fire station and will initiate the evacuation procedure.
3.3 Virtualisation and Emulation Detection
It is very clear now that the detection of forged machines and therefore virtualised
and emulated embedded systems in the IoT must be a priority for securing information
exchanged by IoT/M2M devices and the IoT core. To date, the detection mechanisms
available have been mostly applied to x86/x64 architectures. Only a few works have
focused on the detection of Android-based emulated environments. Considering the
heterogeneity of the IoT, it is obvious that the available detection methods cannot be
used to detect forged embedded devices. Moreover, most of them rely on the fact that
the detection is made by an application launched manually in the system and that most
of the time this requires a high level of privilege to be executed. Finally, none of them
was applied to M2M communications and IoT scenarios in which the trustor is not in
control of the machines running VESs. In the following subsections, a review of these
detection methods is presented that highlights why they cannot be used in the IoT.
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3.3.1 CPU and Memory Tests
This type of detection method gathers information from the memory and central process-
ing unit (CPU) registers to detect VESs. This method was first introduced by Rutkowska
in 2004 and it was named “The Red Pill”, derived from the film “The Matrix” [206].
It was based on using the Store Interrupt Descriptor Table (SIDT) instruction in a x86
single-core CPU to access the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) register. This register
contains a unique value for each OS running in the system. The author discovered that
the value obtained from the system under consideration differed in REMs and VESs.
However, this is true only in a single-core machine, because there is only one IDT reg-
ister per CPU core, therefore the VES must create an IDT register in another address.
Obviously, this method cannot be applied in newer machines as these have a multi-core
CPU.
Authors in [207] developed an automated method for generating random red pills
by using CPU guided systems. This method was used for detecting emulators in x86
architectures such as QEMU and BOCHS. This method checks if a known instruction
(red-pill) with a known CPU state returns a known value in the memory. If there are
discrepancies when running this instruction in a system, it will submit a detection.
An enhanced method based on CPU and memory tests was proposed by authors
in [208] that involved using all definitions in the IA-32 manual for generating red-pills,
called the cardinal pill.
These detection mechanisms can fail to detect VESs that use real CPUs to execute
instructions instead of virtualising or emulating them. Moreover, these tests were only
applied to system architectures based on the Intel 32-bit architecture. Furthermore, in
the IoT there are several different architectures, such as embedded x86, MIPS, ARM,
PowerPC etc., and it is not reasonable to test all of them to find, if any, specific CPU
instructions and memory information that can lead to the detection of VESs. For these
reasons, CPU and memory tests cannot be used by IoT/M2M machines to detect VESs.
Finally, in future, system-on-chip with customised architectures can be used to create
IoT devices. Therefore, this detection method cannot be applied as it requires previous
knowledge of the architecture, which would be impossible with customised architectures.
3.3.2 Architecture-based Timing Tests
In this method, specific CPU instructions are used to perform a time analysis. Authors
in [209] and [210] showed that by timing the access to CPU control registers in x86/x64
architectures, such as CR0, CR2 and CR3, and the execution of a No Operation (NOP)
instruction, it is possible to detect if the machine is an REM or a VES. These timing
tests were performed in both REMs and VESs, and differences in time values lead to
a detection of VES. However, as noted in the previous section, in the IoT there can
be customised architectures, and as this detection method is architecture-dependent, it
cannot be used by IoT devices for detecting VESs.
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3.3.3 Remote Tests
A remote test involves collecting information from a machine in the network without
relying on running a specific application inside the machine itself. The authors in [211]
proposed a remote test based on a method created by [212] to remotely detect VESs.
The method proposed uses the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) timestamp option,
defined in RFC 1323 [213], to determine the clock skew of the remote machine. The
clock skew of REMs is then compared with the clock skew of the machine under test;
discrepancies will indicate a VES. However, the TCP timestamp option is used only in
Linux-based systems, therefore, machines running other OSs, such as Windows-based
systems, cannot be evaluated. Moreover, authors in [214, 215] demonstrated that by
using the “ntp” daemon application in Linux-based systems it is possible to adjust the
TCP timestamp option value in order to remove the clock skew introduced by a virtual
or emulated system. Usually, a machine uses the “ntp” application based on the Network
Time Protocol (NTP) for synchronising its timestamp. This application retrieves the
time from an Internet-based NTP server with a very accurate external clock. Authors
in [216] demonstrated that it is possible not only to adjust the TCP timestamp option
value, but also to mimic the clock skew of a specific machine. For these reasons, remote
tests presented in the literature are not suitable for detecting VESs in the IoT.
3.3.4 Fingerprinting Tests
This is the most common and easy test used for detecting VESs and it is based on
collecting specific “signatures” from the system, such as driver names, running applica-
tions, system registry keys, hardware IDs (i.e. CPU ID, MAC addresses etc.), system
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) access where available etc.
A fingerprinting method that uses the media access control (MAC) address of a
machine to obtain the vendor name was proposed by authors in [209]. However, it can
be easily faked, for example, by using an application such as MAC-Changer [217].
Further works improved on this solution by collecting information from system
drivers used for specific hardware devices, OS registry keys or applications running
[210, 211]. Another work shows that it is possible to use the APIs provided by a virtual
machine to detect it [218].
There have only been a few studies related that use the fingerprinting test for the
detection of embedded emulated environments, and these are focused on Android-based
devices. A heuristic detection method was proposed by [219]. It is based on combin-
ing the Android API, Android system properties and the system hardware information
and the detection takes around 20 minutes. An enhanced method was proposed by
[220] which uses information about the CPU and graphical performances to detect the
Android’s Dalvik virtual machine.
However, these “signatures” can be easily faked in VES, especially with open source
OSs. For example, I was able to modify the kernel of an embedded Linux OS in order to
display fake CPU information that can be obtained from “/proc/cpuinfo”, as shown in
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Figure 3.2 in system type. This can also be done for every module, driver and application
by modifying their information and recompiling them.
Figure 3.2: Faked CPU information in the OpenWRT embedded Linux system ob-
tained from “/proc/cpuinfo”.
3.4 Solution and Algorithm Design
In the previous section, existing methods for detecting VESs were presented and eval-
uated. As highlighted previously, these methods cannot be applied to the IoT system,
leaving it unprotected when forged machines are used for perpetrating attacks. For this
reason, a new approach is needed to enable M2M-embedded devices to detect forged
systems.
VESs are normally used by developers, anti-virus companies and researchers as test
environments for testing applications without a real embedded hardware and for studying
malware behaviour. This is because the execution of a set of instructions in a VES
should be the same as the execution in an REM. When a VES is used, it translates all
instructions from the host architecture to the virtualised or emulated system, called the
guest. For example, if the VES is running in a 64-bit architecture and virtualising an
ARM embedded architecture, it must translate everything from the 64-bit to the ARM
architecture. Each part of the embedded system must be translated, including CPU
instructions, memory management, physical devices management etc., which requires
time.
Authors in [221, 222] identified that VESs introduce various behaviours that cause
differences in system resource availability, timing dependences and I/O device com-
munication. These behaviours were also exploited by architecture-based timing tests.
However, these tests are significantly limited by the fact that previous knowledge of the
architecture is required to compare timing access to specific CPU registers and memory
locations.
For these reasons, in this thesis, a new generalised and novel approach to detecting
forged embedded machines is presented. This is based on the premise that the machine
architecture should be treated as a black-box. The detection method uses the timing
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behaviours of embedded machines. It can be subdivided into two parts: the characteri-
sation of embedded machine behaviours and the machine emulation detection algorithm
(MEDA), as presented in the following subsections.
The first part can be implemented securely by using a Mobile Agents Platform
(MAP), which is a system based on IoT Mobile Agents (IoT MAs) with the ability
to migrate from one device to other devices in the network in order to perform spe-
cific tasks. A MAP creates an opportunity to reduce the network load and latency,
encapsulate different protocols, act asynchronously and autonomously, be dynamically
adaptable, work in heterogeneous contexts, be robust and fault-tolerant, provide secu-
rity mechanisms and work in several application scenarios with different interactions
[223, 224].
The MAP architecture consists of several components according to the IEEE Foun-
dation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) standard [225]:
• Agent management or agency manages mobile agents and controls their creations
and operations within and across the MAP;
• Agent communication allows a mobile agent to communicate with its creator and
the agent management;
• Agent transport is responsible for managing the transportation of information,
including security mechanisms, across the MAP;
• Agent security manager is responsible for maintaining the security of the MAP;
• Applications provide the execution environment for a mobile agent and deal with
different application scenarios in which there could be several types of interactions.
Figure 3.3 shows the detection model which employs IoT MA. Specifically, the agency
in node “A” creates an IoT MA and sends it to node “B”. The IoT MA runs the
characterisation algorithm in node “B” and the results are sent back to the agency in
node “A”. “A” then runs MEDA to determine if “B” is a REM or VES. As trust is
asymmetrical, the agency in node “B” will perform the same steps to evaluate the trust
of node “A”.
For security reasons, the agency creates a secure environment, giving IoT mobile
agents the opportunity to perform only the characterisation test. This can be achieved by
implementing resources access control with limited privileges and limiting the execution
time [226]. A trusted third party can create an IoT MA with the capability to generate
random numbers and publicly release its hash sum value using, for example, Secure
Hash Algorithms (SHAs). This can then be included in agencies and used to verify the
authenticity of the IoT MA before its execution. In fact, if the IoT MA is modified by
an attacker, this will result in a different hash value.
Two steps are performed to create a secure connection between the agency that
created the IoT MA and the IoT MA: (i) the agency generates a public/private key pair
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Figure 3.3: Representation of the detection model. The agency in “A” sends the IoT
MA to “B” (1). IoT MA runs the characterisation algorithm locally in “B” (2) and
then sends the results back to the agency in “A” (3). “A” performs the final detection
(4).
and (ii) the IoT MA carries the generated public key of the agency. This public key
will be used by the IoT MA to generate a shared key for encrypting and decrypting the
characterisation results by using, for example, RSA, as discussed in Subsection 2.4.1.
The steps to secure the communication are summarised in Figure 3.4. In order to be
effective, it is assumed that the MAP satisfies two basic requirements: (i) the target
agency allows the IoT MA to run the characterisation and (ii) the IoT MA must have a
connection with the originator agency. If these conditions are not satisfied, the trustor
will not trust the trustee and will stop the communication.
In this scenario, the communication between the agency and the IoT MA cannot be
eavesdropped by using MITM attacks as the IoT MA knows the agency’s public key.
Security policies should be applied to protect the system against DoS attacks and avoid
battery draining (if present) caused by multiple IoT MAs running the characterisation
algorithm. For example, an IoT-embedded machine can decide not to allow an IoT MA
to run if, for example, system resources (battery, CPU level etc.) are below a specific
threshold or if there are several IoT MAs running at the same time.
3.4.1 Characterisation Algorithm
The characterisation algorithm extracts timing behaviours from embedded machines. It
is based on Hypothesis 1 and represented in Figure 3.5.
Hypothesis 1. Every VES introduces delays caused by translating and executing in-
structions from the host to the guest architecture. This causes differences in timing
behaviours between a VES and an REM.
The characterisation algorithm is based on pinging the localhost (127.0.0.1)2 in the
system under consideration many times (e.g. 1000) in order to characterise behaviours
related to the ping response time (P.), timestamp values (T.) and CPU usage (C.) for
each ping, as shown in Figure 3.6. Timestamp values are used as control information;
2This is the default address for localhost for the IPv4 protocol [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5735].
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Agency A Agency B
A       = {e,n}PUk
A       = {d,n}PRk
Calculate hash sum value of IoT MA
and compare with     , if valid execute it
C = K           ne mod
K = C           nmod
Trusted
Third Party
IoT Mobile Agent (IoT MA)
IoT Mobile Agent             A      PUk
Create the IoT MA, 
append the public key
and send it to node B
IoT Mobile Agent
Generate a
public/private key pair
Random generated key (   )K
Perform characterisation
Encrypt results using    K
Retrieve shared key
Decrypt characterisation 
results
,      K
d
Hash sum
value
Send an encrypted
request to perform
the characterisation 
Figure 3.4: Representation of security mechanisms in MAP for characterising
IoT-embedded machines.
if an attacker tries to fake the ping response time, the algorithm will rely on changes in
timestamp values and vice versa. In fact, in order to fake both or one of these values,
an attacker must implement new functionalities. These functionalities will be executed
after they are translated from the host architecture to the virtualised or emulated system.
This translation will require some time, which will increase the time between two pings
(T.) and the characterisation time. These timing discrepancies can be used by the
trustee to detect that the attacker is trying to fake the characterisation result.
The ping response time was obtained by using the “ping” command, the timestamp
values were obtained by using the “date” command, and the CPU usage was determined
by extracting information from “/proc/stat” file or the “iostat” command depending on
the OS used. However, CPU usage is mentioned only for reference and is not used for
detecting forged embedded machines as this could be easily faked by running several
concurrent applications.
The “ping” command is used for several reasons. Firstly, it is available in almost
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Real Embedded System
Real Embedded Hardware
(i.e. ARM, MIPS, etc.)
Embedded Operating System
Application
Execution
Execution
Host
Real Hardware
(i.e. x86, x86-64, etc.)
Operating System/Hypervisor
Instructions
Translation
Transparent
Execution
Virtualised or Emulated
Embedded System
Embedded Operating System
Application
Virtualised or Emulated
Embedded Hardware
Execution
Execution
Delays
introduced
by VESs
Figure 3.5: Hypothesis behind the characterisation algorithm concerning the differ-
ence in time behaviours for translating and executing instruction in REMs and VESs.
Start
ping localhost
Is it still
pinging?
Store ping
response time (ms)
Store
timestamp (s)
Finish
P.
T.
YesNo
Store
CPU usage (%)
C.
Figure 3.6: Characterisation algorithm flowchart. The ping command is used locally
and information from ping response time (P.), timestamp (T.) and CPU usage (C.) is
stored.
all systems with Internet connectivity, including IoT/M2M devices. It is obvious that it
cannot be applied to IoT-embedded devices that do not support the ping command. For
these devices a different method for extracting timing behaviour is required. Secondly,
it is used to obtain precise timing information that is strictly related to the networking
stack used by IoT/M2M devices. Another reason is that it will be difficult for attackers
to fake the timing information provided by pinging locally, as it uses network sockets
for managing the ping packets. These sockets reside in the kernel space of an OS and
only its modification may allow an attacker to fake the timing information. Attackers
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that try to fake the ping characterisation results must actively modify part of the kernel
of a VES by checking when a network socket is created and handle it every time. This
task can increase the overall delay and decrease system performance, especially in the
presence of embedded environments. Furthermore, modifying the kernel is not always
possible, especially if the system is not open source.
In fact, when the system in a VES receives ping packets, it will automatically create
ping request and response packets, and manage these in both kernel and user space.
As described previously, these operations require translating every instruction from the
host to the guest architecture. Therefore, it is unlikely that the behaviours will be the
same in VESs and REMs.
Moreover, if the attacker tries to slow down the VES response time in order to fake
the characterisation, the agency that requests the characterisation can use its local time
to detect this. This can be achieved by measuring the difference between the request
(TReq) and the response (TResp) of the characterisation as follows:
TResp − TReq ≈ TCh + ∆TCh + ℮(∆TRTT ) (3.1)
where TCh is the time required for the characterisation, ∆TCh is a very small amount of
time (around 2 seconds) in which the IoT mobile agent receives the request, launches the
characterisation, receives the results and sends them back to the trustor IoT agency, and
℮(∆TRTT ) is the estimated round-trip times after TCh plus ∆TCh seconds are elapsed.
For example, if the characterisation is supposed to take 3 minutes, the difference should
not be longer than 3 minutes plus network communication delays and the trustee IoT
mobile agent delays, but not less than that.
For each target, eight tests were performed in which the ping command was tuned
with different options and stressing the CPU (whereby the CPU usage is maintained
around 100%), as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: List of ping characterisation tests performed.
Test# Ping option CPU stress
1 -c 1000 -i 0.2 No
2 -c 1000 -i 0.2 Yes
3 -c 1000 No
4 -c 1000 Yes
5 -c 1000 -s 20000 No
6 -c 1000 -s 20000 Yes
7 -c 1000 -s 20000 -i 0.2 No
8 -c 1000 -s 20000 -i 0.2 Yes
-c: stop after sending n ping packets
-i: wait n seconds between sending each packet
-s: specifies the number of data bytes to be sent
In order to stress the CPU, the “dd” command was employed using the random device
as input and the NULL device as output (dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/null). Multiple
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instances of the “dd” command were executed in embedded machines with multi-core
CPU. This stressed not only the CPU but also the kernel, because in Linux, random and
NULL devices are managed in the kernel space. During the simulations, systems were
performing SSH connections with a server which was used to request the characterisation
and collect its results. The test-bed used during the simulation is shown in Figure 3.7.
In this, systems were connected to a switch via Ethernet cables. High-priority traffic
was not considered during the simulations, and it cannot be excluded that this may have
affected the kernel behaviour.
REM 1
REM 2
REM   
VESs
N
Trustor
Ethernet connection
Switch
Figure 3.7: Test-bed used during the simulations for performing characterisation
requests and collect their results from REM and VES systems.
3.4.2 Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm
The task of the machine emulation detection algorithm (MEDA) is to use the output
of the characterisation algorithm that is applied to the target machine, and then to
predict it to be either an REM or VES. To do this, Characterisation Metrics (CMs) are
extracted from behaviours of REMs, as shown in Table 3.3.
The REMs used for obtaining the CMs are ALIX 6F2 [227], Google Nexus 5 and 7
[228, 229], Carambola [230], Arduino Yu´n [231] and Raspberry Pi [232]. A range for each
CM is obtained by applying the characterisation algorithm to every REM considered.
Results are shown in Table 3.4, and these ranges of CMs are then used as threshold
values for detecting VESs.
In this table, results from different tests were merged in order to evaluate the dif-
ferent behaviours of each machine. This was done because a machine can have several
applications running at the same time. Therefore, by merging results from tests 1 and
3 (normal operation after booting) and tests 2 and 4 (intensive operation), it is possible
to obtain useful data independently from the machine operational status. As the be-
haviours of the ping response time from all the tests were not very different (with and
without stressing the CPU, and with different delays between two pings), these were
merged to obtain a unique range. For the same reason, the results from tests 1 and 2,
and tests 3 and 4, in terms of timestamp values also were merged. Moreover, this was
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Table 3.3: Characterisation metrics.
Metric Equation
Minimum (Min) min = min(xi)
Maximum (Max) max = max(xi)
Range range = min−max
Sum sum =
∑N
i=1 xi
Mean µ = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi
Variance σ2 = 1N
∑N
i=1(xi − µ)2
Standard deviation (SD) σ =
√
1
N
∑N
i=1(xi − µ)2
Mean-Standard deviation (Mean-SD) µ− σ
Mean+Standard deviation (Mean+SD) µ+ σ
xi = i -th sample; N = number of samples; freq = most frequent value;
sort = values in sorted order.
done also for CPU usage results, but only for tests in which the CPU was not under
stress.
As shown in Table 3.4, the results from test 1 to 4 show three behaviours: ping
response time (P.) for all tests; the behaviours of timestamp values (T.) when the same
interval between pings is chosen; and the behaviours of the CPU usage (C.) when the
CPU was not under stress conditions. Note that tests 5 to 8 are not shown in this
table; these were excluded because they do not give reliable results for detecting VESs.
Specifically, there was an issue related to the ping option used to specify the ping packet
size. In fact, large-sized ping packets require high computational resources and some
embedded systems are not able to handle them properly.
The behaviours of REMs shown in Table 3.4 are used by MEDA as a threshold value
for detecting VESs. Let TMinREMs (CMi) and TMaxREMs (CMi) be the minimum
and maximum value in the range for the i -th characterisation metric from Table 3.3.
Let TT (CMi) be the i -th characterisation metric obtained from the target system. A
VES is considered detected if one of the following equations is valid:
TT (CMi) < TMinREMs (CMi) (3.2)
TT (CMi) > TMaxREMs (CMi) (3.3)
MEDA is summarised in Figure 3.8.
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Input: set of characterisation metrics from the target system
Output: true or false
for each CMi ∈ CM :
if (TT (CMi) < TMinREMs (CMi) ||
TT (CMi) > TMaxREMs (CMi))
return true // illegitimate REM
return false // legitimate REM
Figure 3.8: Pseudo code for the Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm (MEDA).
3.5 Results and Discussion
To evaluate the capability of MEDA to detect forged embedded machines, several VESs
were tested; these are shown in Table 3.5. All the VESs were implemented using a
machine running Linux Mint 17 (qiana) with kernel 3.13.0-24-generic OS, an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i3-4130 CPU @ 3.40GHz CPU with 4 cores and 7897 MiB of RAM, with
default configurations.
Table 3.5: List of virtualised and emulated embedded systems (VESs) tested.
VES Notation Architecture OS
Android Emulator [233] AE ARMv7 Android 4.4.2
Genymotion [234] GN Embedded x86 Android 4.4.4
GXemul [235] GX1 MIPS NetBSD 5.0.2
GXemul [235] GX2 MIPS NetBSD 6.1.5
OVPsim [236] OVP MIPS Debian
QEMU [237] Q1 MIPS OpenWrt 12.09
QEMU [237] Q2 MIPSel OpenWrt 12.09
QEMU [237] Q3 ARMv6l Raspbian
VirtualBox [238] VB Embedded x86 OpenWrt 10.03
VMware [239] VM Embedded x86 OpenWrt 14.07
Results of MEDA are shown in Figures 3.9 and 3.10. In order to obtain each de-
tection, ranges of CMs from Table 3.4 are used. For example, results from tests 1 and
2 (Figure 3.9) show that behaviours of GXemul with NetBSD 6.1.5 (GX2) were out-
side ranges of P.Sum, P.Mean and P.Mean-SD. Therefore, the number of detections by
applying MEDA is three, giving as a final result, that GX2 is a VES.
Furthermore, these results show that the Android Emulator (AE) is more easily
detected than GX2. At the same time, it is possible to see that changing the OS version
can result in an easier detection, as shown by GX1 and GX2 results. Finally, it is clear
that all VESs can be detected by using only four CMs: P.Sum, P.Mean±SD and T.Sum.
Moreover, by comparing the results from Figures 3.9 and 3.10, it is possible to see that
MEDA works better with the information retrieved by the characterisation algorithm
during tests 3 and 4 rather than tests 1 and 2. Furthermore, tests 3 and 4 require
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Figure 3.9: MEDA results for tests 1 and 2.
Figure 3.10: MEDA results for tests 3 and 4.
only around 3 minutes, while tests 1 and 2 require around 17 minutes to detect forged
embedded machines.
Therefore, by using the characterisation algorithm with a ping interval of 200 ms
(tests 3 and 4), MEDA can detect a forged embedded machine within 3 minutes with
a detection accuracy of 79.21%. Moreover, MEDA associates every item labelled as
REM belonging to REMs (precision = 1), but almost half of the items from REMs were
labelled as belonging to VESs (recall = 0.4455). While, almost every item labelled as
VES belongs to VESs (precision = 0.7504) and all of the items from VESs were labelled
as belonging to VESs (recall = 1). Detailed results can be found in Appendix B.1. From
these results, MEDA is capable of detecting VESs within a certain degree of accuracy,
but it has problems in recognising REMs. These aspects and detection time are very
important for minimising the power consumption of battery-powered embedded devices,
and also for enabling a system to be trusted easily and quickly.
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3.5.1 Comparison with Other Techniques
For the reasons explained in Section 3.3, methods available in the literature for de-
tecting VESs cannot be used in the IoT. In fact, these are mostly architecture- and
OS-dependent, and they cannot easily be applied in embedded devices due to their het-
erogeneity. IoT devices should be treated as black-boxes without previous knowledge of
their architectures and OSs. This is a very important aspect for two main reasons: (i) the
architecture can be hand-crafted using Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)-based
boards, and (ii) future IoT devices may have a different or an improved architecture,
which may lead to different instruction sets, e.g. instructions used until ARMv4 were
not able to access half-word objects in the memory, although this is not true for newer
ARM versions [240]. However, the only detection method that could be used in all
situations is the fingerprinting test, but it can be easily attacked as demonstrated in
Subsection 3.3.4.
The fingerprinting test was able to extract “signatures” from only the Genymotion,
VirtualBox and VMware systems. Results from this test are shown in Table 3.6. The
“signatures” used for detecting these VESs are vbox, virtualbox, virtualized, oracle,
innotek, intel, genuineintel, genymotion, vmware and their variants.
Despite how difficult it is to use existing methods to detect VESs, the
architecture-based timing test [209, 210] has been successfully implemented in the Rasp-
berry Pi 2 system model B based on an ARM Cortex-A7 CPU. This has been tested in
both the real hardware and the QEMU v2.12.0-rc0 emulated system. This test has been
implemented as a loadable kernel module, as this is the only way to access the CPU
registers of the Raspberry Pi 2. As highlighted in Subsection 3.3.2, this test consists of
timing the access to CPU control registers and an NOP operation. In the Raspberry Pi
2, there is only one available system control register (SCTLR) [241], and this has been
used during the timing test. The timing information is retrieved with the cycle count
register (CCNT). Moreover, the QEMU has been modified in order to adjust the cycle
count register because the frequency of the ARM processor is not configurable. This
modification helped to defeat the timing test. The kernel module used to perform the
test and a patch for QEMU are available in Appendices A.5 and A.6. Results from the
Raspberry Pi 2 and QEMU were the same. The time required by an NOP operation is
equal to 1 clock cycle and the time required to access the SCTLR registers is equal to 2
clock cycles. These results show that the architecture-based timing test is not a viable
test for detecting VESs when embedded machines are used. The application of this test
is also limited by the fact that, in order to access the SCTLR and the CCNT registers,
super user access is required. This is very dangerous as an attacker can use this access
to destroy the system or gather all types of information.
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Table 3.6: Fingerprinting information from Genymotion, VirtualBox and VMware.
Signatures from files or
applications
Information GN VB VM
/proc/cpuinfo Real CPU characteristics Yes Yes Yes
/proc/version Linux version Yes No No
/proc/misc Virtual users Yes No No
/proc/ioports Virtual devices Yes No No
/proc/kcore Physical memory and
system message
Yes Yes Yes
dmesg
/sys/devices/pciXXXX :XX /XX
XX :XX :XX.X /XXXX :XX :XX.X /
usb1/1-2/product
Hard disk, USB and
CD-ROM devices
Yes Yes Yes
/sys/devices/pciXXXX :XX /XX
XX :XX :XX.X /XXXX :XX :XX.X /
usb1/1-2/configuration
/sys/devices/pciXXXX :XX /XX
XX :XX :XX.X /XXXX :XX :XX.X /
usb1/1-2/1-2:1.0/interface
/proc/scsi/scsi
/sys/sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/
sys vendor
System vendor Yes No No
/sys/sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/
board name
Board version Yes No No
/sys/sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/
board vendor
Board vendor Yes No No
/sys/sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/
bios vendor
BIOS vendor Yes No No
/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/DSDT
ACPI table information Yes Yes Yes/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/FACP
/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/SSDT
/fstab.vbox86 Virtual machine boot
files
Yes No No
/init.vbox86.rc
lsmod
Virtual modules Yes No No
/system/lib/vboxsf.ko
/system/lib/vboxguest.ko
/system/lib/vboxvideo.ko
/system/bin/androVM-prop
Virtual machine software Yes No No/system/bin/androVM-vbox-sf
/system/bin/androVM setprop
ps Virtual machine running
applications
Yes No No
/proc/XXX /mem
/system/build.prop Android information Yes No No
/system/etc/init.androVM.sh Boot scripts Yes No No
X is an integer value identifying the bus number or the process number.
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter, a new threat was presented that uses forged embedded machines to attack
M2M communications in the IoT. Hypotheses of using this attack in real-life scenarios
were also given to underscore its dangerousness when applied to the IoT. A review of
methods for detecting forged embedded machines was carried out and this demonstrated
that current solutions cannot be used to detect this new threat. Therefore, a new
detection method based on embedded machines behaviours called MEDA was proposed
for detecting forged embedded machines in M2M communications. This method allows
M2M-embedded machines to perform the detection without relying on the machine
architecture and the OS. Finally, evaluation of the proposed method showed that it is
effective in detecting VESs. However, limitations related to the time required to identify
forged embedded machines and to properly detect REMs underline the toned for further
study this field. In the next chapter a new method will be proposed which aims to
address these limitations.
Chapter 4
A Classification Approach to
Detecting Forged Embedded
Machines
In Chapter 3, a threat against M2M-embedded machines in the IoT was presented. This
threat is based on the use of forged embedded machines to subvert M2M communications
and create M2FM communications. Several detection methods present in the literature
were reviewed, but these proved to be inapplicable to IoT/M2M-embedded machines.
Therefore, a novel detection method, called MEDA, was presented that uses a range of
behaviours obtained from REMs as threshold values for detecting VESs. In this chapter,
the limitations of MEDA are presented and a new detection method based on a classifi-
cation approach is proposed. This solution has been accepted for publication by Valerio
Selis and Alan Marshall in IEEE Systems Journal under the title, ‘A classification-based
algorithm to detect forged embedded machines in IoT environments’ [110].
4.1 Background and Motivation
In Chapter 3, the available methods for detecting VESs were categorised as:
• CPU and memory tests: memory states, CPU registers and instructions are used;
• Remote tests: information obtained from the network are used;
• Architecture-based timing tests: time analysis using CPU instructions;
• Fingerprinting tests: specific “signatures” from the system are extracted;
• Behavioural tests: system behaviours are used.
Research into detecting forged IoT/M2M-embedded machines is at an early stage.
As shown in Table 4.1, the method proposed in this thesis (MEDA) is the first to address
this specific problem.
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However, as highlighted in Section 3.5, MEDA requires approximately 3 minutes to
identify a forged embedded machine with an accuracy of roughly 79% and has prob-
lems recognising real embedded machines. These performances can lead to limitations
in the applicability of MEDA in IoT environments for three main reasons: (i) moderate
detection uncertainty, (ii) low recognition of real embedded machines and (iii) slowness
in the detection. These issues are related to the time required for the characterisation
and the fact that MEDA represents an embedded machine with a feature space of one
feature per unit time by applying pre-defined threshold values. This can be seen in the
accuracy value, which could include REMs misclassified and/or undetected VESs. For
these reasons, another approach for detecting forged embedded machines in M2M com-
munications in the IoT was developed. This approach consists of the implementation
of a new detection method based on a classification algorithm. In fact, using a classi-
fication algorithm provides an opportunity to represent an embedded machine with a
feature space of two or more features per unit time. In order to speed up the detection,
the characterisation algorithm, presented in Subsection 3.4.1, is tuned (Figure 4.1). The
main difference is that the number of pings for detecting VESs will be determined by
changing the n value. Also, as is expected, by reducing this number it is possible to
decrease the overall detection time.
Figure 4.1: Modified characterisation algorithm for reducing the overall detection
speed by changing the number of pings, in which x is fixed to 0.2.
4.2 Classification-based Algorithm
Classification methods provide an opportunity to assign an observation to a well-known
set of categories. In the case presented here, there are only two categories, real embed-
ded machines and forged embedded machines. This type of classification is well-known
as a binary classification problem. Classification methods use a dataset with a series
of features extracted from past observations for each category. However, choosing a
classifier for detecting forged embedded machines is not a trivial task as it is not pos-
sible to know a priori which one is best to use. Therefore, several supervised learning
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classification methods are used and evaluated, as shown in Figure 4.2. The following
subsections highlight the steps required to efficiently choose the classification method in
order to properly detect forged embedded machines in the IoT. All these steps will be
performed for different numbers of pings, as noted later in this chapter.
Characterisation
Features Extraction
Metrics Normalisation
Feature Selection
SKB-F SKB-Chi2 ERT RFE L1-FS
Normalised Dataset
Initial Dataset
Cross-validation and Classification
DT NB SAMME RF L-SVM
P-SVM R-SVM k-NN LDA QDA
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Performance
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Overall
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Figure 4.2: Steps required for selecting the best classification method.
4.2.1 Initial Dataset
Creating the initial dataset is the first important step for detecting forged embedded
devices in the IoT and is the basis for the classification. It is composed of information
gathered from REMs and VESs using the modified characterisation algorithm. In order
to create a valuable dataset, other REMs and VESs are characterised compared to the
those used in Chapter 3, as summarised in Table 4.2.
An important aspect of creating a good dataset is the number of observations made
of each type of system in order to properly characterise them. Therefore, for each
system, 500 characterisation tests were performed with normal CPU usage and 500
characterisation tests with the CPU under stress (CPU level around 100%). This was
done in order to replicate different behaviours that could occur when a system is running.
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Table 4.2: List of real, virtual and emulated embedded systems characterised.
System Architecture Operating System Type
ALIX 6F2 Embedded x86 Debian REM
Android Emulator ARM Android VES
Arduino Yu´n MIPS OpenWRT REM
Carambola MIPS OpenWRT REM
Genymotion Embedded x86 Android VES
Google Nexus 5 ARM Android REM
Google Nexus 7 ARM Android REM
GXemul MIPS NetBSD VES
Netgear Centria WNDR4700 PowerPC OpenWRT REM
Open Mesh OM2P-LC MIPS OpenWRT REM
OVPsim MIPS Debian VES
QEMU ARM Debian VES
QEMU MIPS OpenWRT VES
QEMU MIPSel OpenWRT VES
QEMU PowerPC OpenWRT VES
Raspberry Pi ARM Debian REM
Samsung Chromebook Series 3 ARM Chrome OS REM
Samsung Galaxy Tab GT-P1000 ARM Android REM
VirtualBox Embedded x86 OpenWRT VES
VMware Embedded x86 OpenWRT VES
REM: real embedded machine; VES: virtual or emulated embedded system.
As this is a binary classification problem, there are 10,000 characterisation tests for
REMs associated to class 0 and 10,000 characterisation tests for VESs associated to
class 1. The dataset is composed of 20,000 observations in total. For each observation,
information about ping response time (P.) and timestamp value (T.) is collected.
4.2.2 Feature Extraction
The next step for classifying REMs and VESs is to extract features from each observation
in the dataset, and in particular from P. and T. measurements. These measurements
are related to the timing behaviours of each system under consideration. Therefore, in
order to calculate their variability, statistical methods are used, as shown in Table 4.3.
Features are extracted from central tendency, dispersion and distribution of the data
after considering Hypothesis 1 (Subsection 3.4.1), in which delays introduced by VESs
can change the timing behaviours over time.
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Table 4.3: Characterisation Features.
Feature Equation
Basic summary statistics
Minimum min = min(xi)
Maximum max = max(xi)
Sum sum =
∑N
i=1 xi
Range range = min−max
Central tendency
Mean µ = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi
Mode mode = freq(X)
Median median = 12
(
xN
2
+ xN
2
+1
)
of sort(X)
Dispersion
Variance σ2 = 1N
∑N
i=1(xi − µ)2
Standard deviation σ =
√
1
N
∑N
i=1(xi − µ)2
Shape
Upper/Lower bounds (95%) U/L = µ± 1.96σ
Skewness SKEW =
∑N
i=1(xi−µ)3
Nσ3
Kurtosis KURT =
∑N
i=1(xi−µ)4
Nσ4
Correlation
Pearson correlation coefficient r =
∑N
i=1(xi−µx)(yi−µy)√∑N
i=1(xi−µx)2
√∑N
i=1(yi−µy)2
X = all samples; xi = i -th sample; N = number of samples;
freq = most frequent value; sort = values in sorted order.
To avoid zero entries in sparse data and improve further steps against small standard
deviations of features, all features are pre-processed by using the Min-Max normalization
method:
x˜ji =
xji −minj
maxj −minj (4.1)
where xji is the i -th value of the j -th feature and max
j and minj are respectively the
maximum and minimum values of the j -th feature. This method normalises the features
in a range between 0 and 1. Therefore, a new dataset is created, called the normalised
dataset, in which there are 14 features for P. and 14 features for T., with a total of 28
features available for characterising each observation.
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4.2.3 Feature Selection
At this stage, the dataset is ready to be used for classification and it contains 28 features,
half from P. and half from T. However, it is possible that not all these features are needed
to properly classify a forged embedded machine. Therefore, a feature selection step is
required. This step is used for selecting the most relevant features present in the dataset.
In fact, by selecting only some of the 28 features, the computational requirements needed
for the detection will be lower than it would be if all of them were used. This not only
reduces the complexity but also speeds up the detection. By looking to Hypothesis 1
(Subsection 3.4.1), it is possible to formulate Hypothesis 2, based on the importance of
features.
Hypothesis 2. REMs are expected to behave in a similar way during their functional
operation because these have analogous capabilities, as highlighted in Table 1.1 (Intro-
duction). Therefore, basic summary features can play an important role in detecting
VESs.
Several feature selection methods are used to create a rank of the best features in
the normalised dataset:
• Extremely Randomized Trees ERT: fits a number of randomized decision trees on
various sub-samples of the dataset [1, 242];
• L1-based Feature Selection L1-FS: removes features by selecting non-zero coeffi-
cients and by adopting a linear Support Vector Machine Classifier (SVC) penalised
with the L1 norm [1, 243];
• Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE): removes features with low weights by adopt-
ing a linear SVC [1, 244];
• Select-K-Best (SKB): selects features by looking to the k highest scores with both
Select-K-Best with ANOVA F-value (SKB-F) and Select-K-Best with Chi-squared
stats of non-negative features (SKB-Chi2) [1].
By applying these methods to the normalised dataset, the best k -th features from
P. and T. are extracted, where k is a value between 1 and 14. Obviously, as previously
noted, at least one feature from P. and T. will be used during the classification in order
to avoid misdetections caused by attackers faking P. or T.
4.2.4 Classification
This step is the core of the classification-based algorithm, in which observations from a
target embedded machine are assigned to a specific category or class of REM or VES.
The classification of a target embedded machine is carried out in two steps: learning
and testing.
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Firstly, the classifier is trained to learn how to identify whether the observation
belongs to a REM or a VES. This is done using pre-collected data (a training set)
in which for each sample the category is well-known. Classifiers can be tuned by using
specific parameters to improve the classification. The best way to select these parameters
is to estimate the classifier performances by using a cross-validation over the training
set. In this thesis, a stratified K-fold cross-validation is used with K equal to 10. It
consists of randomly subdividing the training set into k parts, with equal quantities of
samples in each category, then k − 1 parts are used to train the classifier, and one part
is used to test it. This step is then iterated k times in order to obtain a good estimation
of the classifier performances; in this case, k = 10.
Secondly, the classifier uses its training to classify new observations present in new
data collected (the test set). However, in order to test how well the classifier assigns
new observations to the correct category, the categories in the test set are known, but
these are not used by the classifier.
The normalised dataset is therefore subdivided in two parts: 75% is assigned to the
training set and 25% is assigned to the test set. At this stage, everything is ready for
the classification step. As noted previously, it is not possible to know a priori which
classifier is the best one for detecting forged embedded machines. Therefore, several
supervised learning algorithms for classification problems are used:
• Decision Tree (DT): this is a predictive modelling approach based on a flow
chart-like structure in which internal nodes contain classification rules and leaf
nodes contain class labels. The classification rules are obtained from the data fea-
tures. The predicted class is obtained by testing the value with the decision tree
starting from the root [1, 245–247];
• Na¨ıve Bayes (NB): this is based on Bayes’ theorem with the “naive” independence
assumptions between every tuple of features [1, 248];
• k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN): this method creates instances of the initial dataset
(normalised training set) by assigning a vote based on k neighbour tuples. An
unknown tuple is classified by using these instances and in particular by searching
the k neighbour tuples nearest to it [1];
• Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA): finds a linear decision boundary that is suc-
cessively used to separate classes that are assumed to have the same covariance
[1, 247];
• Random Forest (RF): uses a collection of decision tree classifiers, termed a forest,
on random sub-samples of the dataset (normalised training set). This uses the
average of probabilistic predictions from classifiers to combine them in order to
control the over-fitting [1, 249];
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• Stagewise Additive Modelling using a Multi-class Exponential Loss
Function (SAMME): this is based on the AdaBoost method for multiclass gen-
eralisation of the exponential loss. It consists of fitting a set of weak classifiers on
the dataset (normalised training set) and then it adjusts the weights depending on
the classification results, in order to achieve the best result for subsequent classifi-
cations. The base estimator used for building the boosted ensemble is the optimal
DT [1, 250];
• Support Vector Machine (SVM): this is an algorithm in which the initial dataset
(normalised training set) is transformed to a higher dimension by using non-linear
mapping. A hyperplane is then searched in order to properly separate the classes.
The tuples that fall on this hyperplane are called support vectors [1, 251, 252].
SVM is usually used by default to solve linear problems. However, it is not always
possible to separate data linearly and for this reason kernel methods can be used
to work in high-dimensional spaces. Three kernel methods were used with SVM:
Linear kernel-based SVM (L-SVM), Polynomial kernel-based SVM (P-SVM) and
Radial kernel-based SVM (R-SVM). SVM supports two parameters, C and γ, that
are respectively the penalty for misclassification and the deviation of the kernel;
• Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA): this uses the same concept as LDA, but
a quadratic decision boundary is adopted to separate classes that could have a
different covariance [1, 247].
Table 4.4 shows the tuning parameters used during the classification step for each
classifier according to the Scikit-learn Python module [1].
4.2.5 Performance Evaluation
After classification, another step is required to evaluate the performances of each clas-
sifier in detecting VESs. Each classifier, when assigning samples in the test set to a
specific class, gives classification values. This is a binary classification problem with two
classes: REM, known as positive class (0), and VES, known as negative class (1). These
values are then compared to the real classes for each sample, from which it is possible
to create a confusion matrix (Table 4.5) where:
• True Positives (TP): positive samples that are classified as positive (correct result);
• True Negatives (TN): negative samples that are classified as negative (correct
absence of result);
• False Positives (FP): negative samples that are classified as positive (unexpected
result);
• False Negatives (FN): positive samples that are classified as negative (missing
result).
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Table 4.4: Summary of parameters used for each classifier in the Scikit-learn Python
module [1].
Classifier Parameter Value
DT
criterion gini, entropy
max features 1, sqrt, log2, None
SAMME
base estimator the best DT for each feature tuple
algorithm SAMME, SAMME.R
n estimators 1, 5, 10, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000
RF
max features 1, sqrt, log2, None
n estimators 1, 5, 10, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000
SVM
C 10−2, 10−1, · · · , 103
γ 10−9, 10−8, · · · , 103
k -NN
k neighbours 1, 2, · · · , 30
weights uniform, distance
LDA
solver svd, lsqr, eigen
shrinkage None, auto
Table 4.5: Confusion Matrix.
Predicted class
Yes No
Actual
class
Yes TP FN
No FP TN
In order to evaluate each classifier, four performance measures are used:
• Accuracy : measures how well the classifier classifies the samples;
• Precision: measures how many samples are classified as positive and are actually
positive as a percentage,
• Recall : measures how many positive samples are classified as positive as a per-
centage;
• F1-score: measures the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
Results from these performance measures are between 0 (worst result) and 1 (best
result). The last three performance measures are calculated for both REMs and VESs
in order to understand how well each class is classified. To produce a final performance
value for each classifier, the average of these performance measures is calculated. This
is the Overall Detection Performance (ODP).
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Another aspect to be considered when using classification methods is the time re-
quired to properly classify each observation as this can affect the detection speed. Times
that must be considered are the characterisation time (TCh), the feature extraction time
(TFE) and the classification time (TCl). The total time required is then calculated; this
is termed the ODS. A summary of the equations used are shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Classification evaluation measures.
Measure Equation
Accuracy A = TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN
Precision Pm =
TP
TP+FP
Recall Rm =
TP
TP+FN
F1-score F1m = 2
Pm×Rm
Pm+Rm
Characterisation Time TCh = npings · 0.2s
Feature Extraction Time TFE = FTFE − STFE
Classification Time TCl = FTCl − STCl
Overall Detection Performance ODP ji =
Aji+
∑1
m=0 P
j
mi
+Rjmi+F1
j
mi
7
Overall Detection Speed ODSji = TCh +
T jFE+T
j
Cli
N
m = 0 (REM) or 1 (VES); i is the i -th combination of feature selection
method and classifier; j is the j -th tuple of features selected (kP, kT), where k
is the number of the k -th best features; npings is the number of pings used in
input to the characterisation algorithm; FT and ST are respectively the final
and the starting times for extracting or classify a tuple of features; N is the
number of samples in the test set.
4.2.6 Overall Evaluation
The overall evaluation is the final step needed to combine ODS and ODP and obtain a
final value for identifying the best classifier for different numbers of pings. To do this,
the minimum value of ODS and the maximum value of ODP are calculated for each
tuple of features (j ) and each combination of feature selection methods and classifiers
(i) as:
ODPmaxji = max(ODP
j
i ) (4.2)
ODSminji = min(ODS
j
i ) (4.3)
A score is assigned to ODS and ODP for each tuple of features and each combination
of feature selection methods and classifiers between 0 (worst result) and 5 (best result),
as shown in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7: Evaluation scores for the Overall Detection Performance and Speed.
Ranges ODPscoreji
ODP ji = ODPmax
j
i 5
ODPmaxji < ODP
j
i ≤ ODPmaxji−0.01% 4
ODPmaxji−0.01% < ODP ji ≤ ODPmaxji−0.1% 3
ODPmaxji−0.1% < ODP ji ≤ ODPmaxji−1% 2
ODPmaxji−1% < ODP ji ≤ ODPmaxji−10% 1
ODP ji > ODPmax
j
i−10% 0
Ranges ODSscoreji
ODSji = ODSmin
j
i 5
ODSminji < ODS
j
i ≤ ODSminji+0.001s 4
ODSminji+0.001s < ODS
j
i ≤ ODSminji+0.01s 3
ODSminji+0.01s < ODS
j
i ≤ ODSminji+0.1s 2
ODSminji+0.1s < ODS
j
i ≤ ODSminji+1s 1
ODSji > ODSmin
j
i+1s 0
i = i -th combination of feature selection methods and classifiers; j = j -th
tuple of features selected (kP, kT), where k is the number of features.
Table 4.8: Values of ODP and ODS depending on the security level of the IoT appli-
cation scenario.
Security Level ODP ODS
Extreme 100% 0%
Very high 90% 10%
High 80% 20%
Medium 70% 30%
Low 60% 40%
Very low 50% 50%
It is important to note that it is preferable to give more importance to ODP than
to ODS, because it is better to properly detect forged embedded machines than be fast
and risk not detecting them properly. Towards this end, a ratio of 70% ODP to 30%
ODS was chosen. This corresponds to a medium level of security as per Table 4.8.
Although other ratios were not tested in this work, the level of security can be adjusted
according to the IoT application scenario; for example, in a military application the
extreme security level is recommended, as it confers the highest detection rate. Using
the selected ratio, another measure is calculated, the Final Evaluation Score (FES), as
follows:
FESji =
ODPscoreji × 70
max(ODPscoreji )
+
ODSscoreji × 30
max(ODSscoreji )
(4.4)
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where i is the i -th combination of feature selection methods and classifiers and j is the
j -th tuple of features selected.
FES will return a value between 0 (worst result) and 100 (best result). After obtain-
ing the final overall evaluation of feature selection and classification method, the rank
of the best features used is calculated by:
rank (Xi) =
⋃{ rank (y0 = 1)
rank (yj) = rank (yj−1) + 1
; for j = 1, ..., n (4.5)
where X is a sorted set composed by the sum of how many times each feature is selected,
by considering the i -th combination of feature selection and classifier methods which
return the highest FES, yj is the j -th element in Xi and n is the number of elements in
Xi.
4.3 Simulation and Results
Simulations have been performed by using the Scikit-learn module in Python [1]. To
evaluate the classification algorithm for detecting forged embedded machines, VESs were
used with default configurations under a machine running Linux Mint 17 (qiana) with
kernel 3.13.0-24-generic OS, an Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-4130 CPU @ 3.40 GHz CPU with
4 cores and 7897 MiB of RAM.
In this section, results from each step are presented by changing the number of pings
in the characterisation algorithm 7 times with values of 1000, 500, 200, 100, 50, 25 and
15.
Table 4.9 shows information related to the times required for extracting all features
from the initial dataset and for characterise a target embedded machine. As the timing
information shows, changing the number of pings decreases the detection time.
Table 4.9: Timing information related to the characterisation and features extraction
steps.
Number
of pings
Characterisation
time (s)
Extraction of all
features from the
dataset (s)
Extraction of all
features from a
target (s)
1000 200 43.229 0.002
500 100 29.558 0.001
200 40 21.304 0.001
100 20 18.778 0.001
50 10 18.100 0.001
25 5 17.651 0.001
15 3 16.651 0.001
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The time required by feature selection methods for selecting the best tuple of features
and by changing the number of pings is shown in Figure 4.3. The fastest feature selection
method is SKB-F; the slowest is RFE. It is also possible to see that changing the number
of pings does not affect the time for selecting the tuple with the best features. The time
required by classification methods for classifying the best tuple for each number of pings
is shown in Figure 4.4. In this figure, only results from classifiers that return the best
classification for at least one tuple for the specified number of pings are shown. It is
possible to see that SAMME returns the best classification of only one best tuple for 50
pings. The fastest classification method and the slowest on average are k -NN and RF
respectively.
By summarising timing information from Table 4.9, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, it
is clear that characterisation time is the liming factor. This is related to the number
of pings. Therefore, it is possible to drastically speed up the detection of forged em-
bedded devices and reduce the time by reducing the number of pings in input to the
characterisation algorithm.
The rank of the features selected using Equation 4.5 for different numbers of pings
is shown in Figure 4.5. Because the lower value means that the feature was selected by
the best combination of feature selection and classification methods, the features P.min
and T.sum are the best. Therefore, these features are key for detecting VESs, thus
confirming Hypothesis 2.
Important results are obtained from two main steps, feature selection and classifica-
tion. Results from the first step are shown in Figure 4.6. The feature selection method
that works well for selecting the best 2 and 4 features is SKB-F. L1-FS selects the best
features from 10 to 18. ERT works very well for all different numbers of pings in selecting
the best 2 to 26 features. SKB-Chi2 was used only to select the best 22 features. Finally,
RFE was able to select the best features only five times (2, 4, 6, 24 and 26 features) for
100 and 200 pings. Results are not shown for the (14P, 14T) tuple as all features are
used; therefore, in this case, this tuple is not necessary for the selection step.
In the second step, the best tuple of features selected from the first step and for
different numbers of pings is used by each classification method for the classification.
Results from this step are shown in Figure 4.7, in which the classification methods that
return the highest FES value are shown. For this reason, the classification methods
not present returned the lowest FES value and are not considered for classifying target
embedded machines. From Figure 4.7, it is possible to see that k -NN is able to classify
REMs and VESs by using the best 2 and 4 features for high and small number of pings.
Meanwhile, RF is the best classification method overall as it is able to properly recognise
REMs and VESs for a wide range of numbers of pings. SAMME and DT classify the
best tuple of features only sporadically.
The results for ODP obtained by the best classifier for different numbers of pings
are shown in Figure 4.8. These results show that a saturation point is reached when
the best (5P,5T) tuple is selected. In Figures 4.6 and 4.7, the best feature selection and
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Figure 4.3: Time required by feature selection methods to select the best features
from the training set and for different numbers of pings.
Figure 4.4: Time required by the best classification methods to classify all data
present in the training set for different numbers of pings. Missing values mean that the
classification method was not used for classifying a best tuple for that number of pings.
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Figure 4.5: Features ranked by how many times they were selected by the best feature
selection method for different numbers of pings. P. refers to ping response time, T. to
timestamp values, and the abbreviations for features from Table 4.6 are used. For
example, P.L means lower bound value of ping response time.
classification methods for the best 10 features are ERT and L1-FS, and RF respectively.
Detailed results obtained by combining these methods are shown in Figure 4.9. In
this, k -NN is also shown as it is the second classification method that gave a good
classification. However, both ERT and L1-FS with RF perform better than ERT and
L1-FS with k -NN. It is very interesting to note that k -NN, with the 10 features selected
by L1-FS and for 15 pings, returns an ODP value of around 6 percentage points less
compared to RF. This may be related to the relatively small variations obtained from
15 pings. In this and subsequent figures, the relation between number of pings and time
is also shown for reference, which can be derived using:
time = n · x (4.6)
where n is the number of pings and x is the waiting seconds between sending each ping
that is equal to 0.2 seconds. Table 4.10 shows the parameters used by k -NN and RF
in the Scikit-learn Python module [1] for obtaining the best results for both ERT and
L1-FS feature selection methods and 25 and 200 pings. Information about the time
required for the combination of the best feature selection and classification method is
shown in Figure 4.10, in which k -NN is faster than RF, but RF is preferred over k -NN
because more weight is given to ODP than ODS.
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Figure 4.8: ODP value related to best combination of feature selection methods and
classifiers that give the highest FES for different numbers of pings and features.
Table 4.10: Summary of parameters used by the best feature selection methods and
classifiers for 25 and 200 pings in the Scikit-learn Python module [1].
Classifier Parameter
Feature Selection Method /
Number of pings
ERT L1-FS
25 200 25 200
RF
max features sqrt sqrt sqrt sqrt
n estimators 500 1000 1000 500
k -NN
k neighbours 4 2 1 1
weights distance uniform uniform uniform
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Figure 4.9: ODP value related to best combination of feature selection methods and
classifiers for different numbers of pings and for the (5P, 5T) tuple.
Figure 4.10: Time required to classify a sample using the best combination of feature
selection methods and classifiers for different numbers of pings and for the (5P, 5T)
tuple. The average of the time required with its standard deviation is shown.
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As these results demonstrate, it is possible to clearly classify REMs and VESs with
an ODP value greater than 99.5% with only 25 pings by using L1-FS and RF. Meanwhile,
an ODP value of around 99.9% is reached with 200 pings using ERT and RF. The best
10 features selected by L1-FS are P.min, P.median, P.L, P.SKEW, P.KURT, T.sum, T.µ,
T.range, T.L and T.SKEW, whereas for ERT they are P.min, P.sum, P.µ, P.median, P.L,
T.sum, T.mode, T.median, T.U and T.r. These features are different because increasing
the number of pings generates more data, therefore, some features can increase accuracy
during classification, whilst other features can reduce it by introducing uncertainty.
4.3.1 Comparison with MEDA
To evaluate the improvements introduced by the classification methods that are able to
properly classify REMs and VESs, a comparison with MEDA is shown in Figure 4.11.
To obtain comparable results, the threshold values used by MEDA during the detection
are re-evaluated using behaviours from REMs in Table 4.2 (Section 4.2.1). It is quite
clear that the classification methods are much better than MEDA by a difference of
13 percentage points using 1000 pings, 21 percentage points using 200 pings and 28
percentage points using 25 pings. Despite the increasing percentage points, it is easy to
note that classification methods always give an ODP value above 99%, while MEDA is
lower, ranging from 86.5% to 68.7%.
Figure 4.12 compares the average classification time of the classification methods
with that of MEDA. While MEDA is shown to be faster than the classification methods
by changing the number of pings, the final evaluation score (FES) calculated for MEDA
is very low, as more importance is given to the detection of forged embedded machines.
For this reason, detection based on the classification methods presented in this chapter is
a better solution. This figure also shows that the average time required is dependent on
the number of pings. In fact, by using a small number of pings, features extracted could
have close values for both REMs and VESs. This aspect will require more computational
resources to classify properly forged embedded machines and therefore more time is
required. Furthermore, the trend of the average time required by RF using features
selected by ERT is logarithmic, while the trend from using features selected by L1-FS
is exponential. Features selected by L1-FS help to speed up the classification for almost
every number of pings compared to ERT, until the intersection point of 25 pings, at
which the time required doubled and increased rapidly.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, a short summary of current solutions for detecting VESs was presented
and their current issues was highlighted. A novel solution based on classification methods
for detecting forged embedded machines in the network was presented. Each step needed
to properly classify REMs and VESs was described. Results show the high efficiency
of this approach in terms of time required for the detection and the high detection
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of ODP for MEDA and the best classification methods.
Figure 4.12: Comparison of the average classification time for MEDA and the best
classification methods.
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performance. A comparison with a previously proposed detection method showed that
this new approach is better.
It was demonstrated that it is possible for an IoT/M2M-embedded machine to
recognise forged embedded machines in only 5 seconds with a detection rate of around
99.5%. Moreover, this detection rate can be increased up to 99.9% by increasing the
wait to only 40 seconds. These aspects show that this solution can be easily used by
IoT/M2M-embedded machines to eliminate possible threats, especially in relation to
power-constrained machines and dynamic networks. Another important aspect of using
the proposed method is that it is completely agnostic from the machine architecture and
the OS used.
In the next chapter, an attack against these classification-based methods is presented
which involves using a powerful machine to mimic behaviours of embedded machines.
Moreover, a method of defence is studied and presented in order to detect the attack,
thereby enabling recognition of forged embedded machines in the IoT network. Finally,
the applicability of this solution to the IoT is discussed.
Chapter 5
Attack and Defence in
Behavioural Tests
In the previous chapters, the importance of securing M2M communications from attack-
ers using forged embedded machines in the IoT was presented. Available methods in the
literature for detecting virtual and/or emulated embedded systems in the IoT, such as
CPU and memory tests, remote tests, architecture-based timing tests and fingerprinting
tests, proved to be inapplicable in real scenarios. In this thesis, two behavioural tests
based on characterising behaviours of IoT/M2M-embedded machines, both real and
forged, were presented and studied. These methods extract timing behaviours from the
system using a characterisation algorithm. This algorithm retrieves information related
to ping response time (P.) and timestamp values (T.) provided by pinging localhost.
Statistical features from P. and T. are then extracted and used for detecting forged em-
bedded machines in the network. The method proposed in Chapter 4 has proven to be
efficient and quicker than the method proposed in Chapter 3. However, these methods
do not consider an attacker using machines with higher capabilities than embedded ma-
chines to mimic the behaviours of real embedded machines. This issue can be used by
an attacker to create M2FM communications in the IoT.
In the next sections, an attack against these methods is evaluated and a defence
mechanism is designed, tested and compared with existent methods for detecting forged
embedded machines. This solution was published by Valerio Selis and Alan Marshall in
Proceedings of the 1st Cyber Security in Networking Conference (CSNet’17), under title
‘A Fake Timing Attack Against Behavioural Tests Used in Embedded IoT M2M Com-
munications’ [111]. The applicability of the proposed solution to real-life IoT scenarios
is also discussed at the end of this chapter.
5.1 Threat Model
Thus far in this thesis, real embedded machines (REMs) have been able to properly
detect forged embedded machines in M2M communications by assuming that an at-
tacker uses virtual and/or emulated embedded systems (VESs). However, if an attacker
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knows that behavioural tests are used for detection, instead of using VESs, it could use
a powerful machine to mimic the timing behaviours of an REM, as shown in Figure
5.1. Figure 5.1(a) shows an example of threat model in which the attacker is able to
create M2FM communications. In this example, real embedded machines (A and C)
will presume that they are communicating with another “real” embedded machine (B).
Therefore, these will begin to trust it and will establish an M2M communication. In
reality, as shown in Figure 5.1(b), the attacker is using a modified powerful machine in
order to be recognised as a real embedded machine without using VESs. This attack
is termed as a Fake Timing Attack (FTA) and it is explained in the following section.
This kind of attack is detected by following Hypothesis 3.
A
R-HW
OS
App
(b) Actual Network
A B
(a)A's network view
B
R-HW
OS
App
C
R-HW
OS
App
C
Embedded
System
Embedded
System
Embedded
System
Embedded
System
Embedded
System
Powerful System
M2M communication
M2FM communication
Figure 5.1: Attack scenario in which an attacker uses a powerful machine to mimic
the timing behaviours of a real embedded machine in order to create M2FM communi-
cations. (a) A’s view about the network is represented, in which the powerful machine
is seen as a real embedded machine. (b) The actual network is shown with the attacker
“B” launching the attack against “A” and “C”.
Hypothesis 3. An attacker, no matter how powerful his/her computing capabilities are,
is not able to perfectly replicate the timing behaviours of a machine.
5.2 Fake Timing Attack
As stated previously, behavioural tests are based on timing information obtained from P.
and T. Features from this information are then stored in a dataset and used for training
a classification-based algorithm for a later classification of target embedded machines.
In this scenario, a clever attacker could use one entry from the training set related to
an REM and replicate its ping response time and timestamp values.
The aim of the attacker is to conceal itself by pretending to be an REM in order
to create M2FM communications. The only way to achieve this attack is to have the
capability to actively modify the kernel of the powerful machine. This can be done by
using Linux-based OSs. The rationale behind this attack is to insert delays when a ping
request packet is received. This can be achieved because a powerful machine is faster
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than an embedded machine, whereas this method cannot be used in VESs because these
have timing-related problems as per Hypothesis 1 (Subsection 3.4.1). For these reasons,
this attack is called an FTA. An FTA can be very dangerous in scenarios in which there
is a medium to extreme level of security (Table 4.8). In fact, information collected by
one attacker node may be used against businesses and/or governments, affecting their
reputations and security.
An attacker can modify the kernel for the purpose of changing the timing behaviours
of a powerful machine, as shown in Figure 5.2. In this figure, three delta times are
highlighted as follows:
• ∆T0: time required for the ping request packet to reach the kernel space from the
user space;
• ∆T1: time required by the kernel to receive and parse the request packet, cre-
ate a ping response packet, calculate and insert the delay for mimicking the real
embedded machine, and finally send the response packet to the user space;
• ∆T2: time required for the ping response packet to reach the user space from the
kernel space.
ICMP_ECHO
ICMP_ECHOREPLY
ΔT
ΔT ΔT
Characterisation Algorithm
(ping localhost)
Function that
receives the
packet
Function that
sends the
packet
Functions that create
the reply packet
Start timer Insert delay
0
1
2
User space
Kernel space
Figure 5.2: Kernel modification of a powerful machine for the purpose of faking its
timing behaviours in order to mimic behaviours of a real embedded machine.
As Figure 5.2 indicates, the attacker may change its ping response time (TpingEve)
by considering the ping response information of an REM (TpingREM ) and following
these steps:
1. Start a timer when the ping request packet (ICMP ECHO) arrives in the kernel
space;
2. Stop the timer before sending the ping response packet
(ICMP ECHOREPLY) to the user space;
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3. If TpingEve is smaller than TpingREM , delay sending the response packet by
delayEve milliseconds;
4. Send the ping response packet to the user space.
Therefore, the equations used by the attacker for mimicking the timing behaviours
for these steps are:
• The powerful machine response time shown in Figure 5.2 can be expressed as:
TpingEve = ∆T0 + ∆T1 + ∆T2 (5.1)
• If TpingEve < TpingREM , the delay that must be inserted before sending the
response packet must be:
delayEve = TpingREM − TpingEve = TpingREM − (∆T0 + ∆T1 + ∆T2) (5.2)
• However, the attacker can only manage ∆T1 as this is strictly related to the kernel
space. Meanwhile, ∆T0 and ∆T2 can vary for each ping, making their timing
values unknown and unmanageable. Therefore, a clever attacker will estimate
them, resulting in an estimated delay as follows:
℮ (delayEve) = TpingREM − [∆T1 + ℮ (∆T0 + ∆T2)] (5.3)
where:
℮ (∆T0 + ∆T2) = average (TpingEve −∆T1) (5.4)
• From the equations above, it follows that the faked ping response time that the
characterisation algorithm will receive is:
FakedTpingEve = TpingEve + ℮ (delayEve) (5.5)
It is clear that the attacker will be unable to fake its timing behaviours if TpingEve is
greater or equal to TpingREM . The equal condition is valid because the attacker needs
at least some microseconds to calculate its ∆T1, with the result that its FakedTpingEve
will always be greater than TpingREM . These discrepancies will cause the attack to fail,
giving the trustor node an opportunity to detect it. From Equation 5.5 it is possible
to show that theoretically Hypothesis 3 is valid, because the faked ping is based on an
estimation of ∆T0 and ∆T2.
Furthermore, it follows from Equation 5.5, the attacker will have an average trend of
ping response times close, but not identical, to the average trend of the REM. Therefore,
the data distribution obtained by the attacker will be different compared to that of the
REM. In particular, this issue will change the central tendency of the data distribution
obtained from the attacker timing behaviours. Specifically, the frequency of values with
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the same time and the middle timing value will be different with a high probability, as
shown in Figures 5.6(E) and 5.6(F), which show the median and mode ping response
time respectively (see Section 5.4 for further details). This leads to Hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis 4. An FTA can be detected using statistical measurements of the central
tendency of a data distribution, such as median and mode.
5.3 Detection Model
The process of detecting an FTA can be subdivided into three main parts: (i) character-
isation of the behaviours of the target embedded machine, (ii) VES detection and (iii)
the actual FTA detection.
The first part involves of the agency in the trustor node “A” which creates an IoT
MA and sends it to the agency in the target embedded machine “B”. The IoT MA
runs the characterisation algorithm shown in Figure 5.3 upon the request is received
by the agency in “A”. This will provide information about ping response time (P.) and
timestamp values (T.) related to the target embedded machine. At the same time, the
agency in “A” will start a timer. After, it receives the information about P. and T. from
the IoT MA, it will stop the timer and will calculate the elapsed time as per Equation
3.1. If the elapsed time is around 40 seconds (200 pings at 0.2 seconds delay as per
Equation 4.6) plus ∆TCh and ∆TRTT , the second part will be used, otherwise B will be
distrusted.
Figure 5.3: Characterisation Algorithm in which n is fixed to 200 and x is fixed to
0.2.
The second part involves the classification-based detection algorithm presented in
Chapter 4. This uses an RF-trained classifier with the features presented in Table 5.1.
If the value of ODP obtained from the classifier is below a threshold value α, B will be
distrusted and targeted as VES, otherwise the third part will be used. It is important
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Table 5.1: Characterisation features used by RF.
Feature Equation
Minimum (P) min = min(xi)
Sum (P and T) sum =
∑N
i=1 xi
Mean (P) µ = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi
Lower bounds (95%) (T) L = µ− 1.96σ
Upper bounds (95%) (P) U = µ+ 1.96σ
Mode (P and T) mode = freq(X)
Median (P and T) median = 12
(
xN
2
+ xN
2
+1
)
of sort(X)
Pearson correlation coefficient (T) r =
∑N
i=1(xi−µx)(yi−µy)√∑N
i=1(xi−µx)2
√∑N
i=1(yi−µy)2
X = all samples; xi = i -th sample; N = number of samples;
freq = most frequent value; sort = values in sorted order.
to note that these features were normalised in respect to the normalised dataset used
in Chapter 4 (Subsection 4.2.2). This is not feasible in a real-life scenario, because it
requires that each machine in the IoT holds a copy of the normalised dataset. However,
the normalisation of the dataset is not essential for detecting VESs, as close results are
obtained when this step is not taken, as shown in Appendices B.1 and B.2.
Finally, the actual detection of the FTA is carried out using a classification-based
algorithm trained with median and mode features as per Hypothesis 4. Doing so, it
detects if a target embedded machine is faking its timing behaviours. If the value of
ODP obtained from the classifier is below a threshold value β, B will be identified as a
powerful machine launching an FTA and therefore will be distrusted. Otherwise, A will
begin to trust B with a trust value equal to β, and an M2M communication could be
established provided B trusts A.
The final detection algorithm used by an M2M-embedded machine to trust another
M2M-embedded machine in the IoT network is shown in Figure 5.4.
5.4 Simulations, Results and Comparison with Other Al-
gorithms
Simulations are used to determine if the proposed previous algorithms are able to detect
an FTA. They are also performed to evaluate if Hypotheses 3 and 4 are valid (Sections
5.1 and 5.2). The new detection model subsequently is tested and the results from the
simulations are shown. To evaluate the algorithms, a Linux-based OS with a modified
kernel running on a workstation with quad-core i7@2.70GHz CPU and 6 GB of RAM
is used. The kernel is modified by inserting delays, calculated using Equation 5.3,
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Figure 5.4: Model used for detecting a FTA in which n is fixed to 200, x is fixed to
0.2 and TCh is fixed to 40 seconds.
before a response ping packet is sent to the user space, as shown in Figure 5.2. Before
modifying the kernel, Equation 5.4 was used to estimate ℮ (∆T0 + ∆T2) by performing
1000 characterisation tests. As a reference REM, a characterisation test present in the
dataset from an Arduino Yu´n was used for modifying the kernel.
Timing behaviours obtained by performing the characterisation tests from the pow-
erful system, with and without the kernel modifications, are shown in Figure 5.5. In
this figure, the timing behaviours of the reference REM are shown for completeness. As
expected, the average timing behaviour of the powerful machine with the modified kernel
is close to that of the Arduino Yu´n. It is also clear that the timing behaviours with the
modified kernel are very unstable with high standard deviation spikes in respect to the
mean, varying between 0.01 and 0.05 ms.
The characterisation test results obtained by launching an FTA were evaluated
against those produced by MEDA (Chapter 3), and RF and k -NN trained classifiers
with the best 10 features from ERT used in Chapter 4. Results obtained from these
evaluations show that none of the VES detection methods proposed is capable of de-
tecting an FTA. In fact, all these methods return a similarity value as output for a
VES equal to 0% for each characterisation test. Therefore, an attacker using a powerful
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Figure 5.5: Timing information related to the Arduino Yu´n and the FTA for 200
pings. The ping response time of the Arduino Yu´n used as the reference REM is shown
in red. The estimation of the sum of ∆T0 and ∆T2 used by a possible attacker to
modify its ping response time is shown in orange. The estimated delay introduced by
the attacker in the kernel is shown in green. The ping response time of the powerful
machine is shown in light blue. The faked ping response time obtained from the powerful
machine launching the FTA is shown in blue.
machine and launching an FTA is recognised as an REM all the time and will receive a
trust value of 100%.
An extensive evaluation of the features (Table 4.3) extracted from P. after the char-
acterisation tests are carried out is presented in Figure 5.6. In this figure, cumulative
frequency histograms are shown for P. features from the Arduino Yu´n and the power-
ful machine launching the FTA. The corresponding histograms for T. features are not
shown here (see Appendix B.3) as these are similar for the Arduino Yu´n and the pow-
erful machine launching the FTA, meaning that the FTA does not affect the timestamp
values.
The histograms of most of the features obtained from the powerful machine launching
the FTA overlap the corresponding Arduino Yu´n histogram. Therefore, these features
cannot be used to detect an FTA. Meanwhile, histograms from P.mode and P.median
features mostly do not overlap each other, as shown in Figures 5.6(E) and 5.6(F). It is
clear that these features can be used to detect an FTA, as stated in Hypothesis 4.
From the information obtained, RF and k -NN are trained by using P.mode and
P.median features. The dataset and the same steps presented in Section 4.2 are used for
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(a) Minimum value of P. (b) Maximum value of P.
(c) Sum of P. values. (d) Mean of P. values.
(e) Mode of P. values. (f) Median of P. values.
(g) Range of P. values. (h) Variance of P. values.
Figure 5.6: Cumulative frequency histograms for P. features obtained from the Ar-
duino Yu´n and FTA for 200 pings and 1000 characterisation tests.
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(i) Standard deviation of P. values. (j) Upper bound (95%) of P. values.
(k) Lower bound (95%) of P. values. (l) Skewness of P. values.
(m) Kurtosis of P. values. (n) Pearson correlation coefficient of P. val-
ues.
Figure 5.6: (continued) Cumulative frequency histograms for P. features obtained
from the Arduino Yu´n and FTA for 200 pings and 1000 characterisation tests.
training these classifiers, as highlighted in Figure 4.2. Results obtained from algorithms
for detecting forge embedded machines are shown in Table 5.2. Here, the last four rows
show the results for detecting the FTA obtained by combining the classification-based
algorithm proposed in Chapter 4 and the trained classifiers with P.mode and P.median
features. It is possible to show that RF for step (ii) and k -NN for step (iii) (Section
5.3) give the best results for correctly detecting VESs and the FTA. This confirms that
Hypothesis 4 is correct and that it is possible to detect an FTA with a high accuracy.
Therefore, IoT/M2M-embedded machines can use the proposed solution to securely
exchange information in the network.
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Table 5.2: Comparison of methods for detecting forged embedded machines in the
IoT.
Algorithm
Forged Embedded Machine Detection (%)
REM VES FTA
MEDA [6] 21.92 78.32 0
k -NN* [110] 0.68 99.32 0
RF* [110] 0.14 99.89 0
k -NN*+k -NN** [111] 0.68 99.32 93.70
k -NN*+RF** [111] 0.68 99.32 61.11
RF*+k -NN** [111] 0.14 99.89 93.70
RF*+RF** [111] 0.14 99.89 61.11
*Classification-based algorithm presented in Chapter 4;
**RF and k -NN trained with P.mode and P.median features.
5.5 Classification of Unknown Devices
The last point to be determined is if the proposed algorithm is capable of detecting REMs
and VESs that are unknown. This is the same as detecting black-box architectures. In
fact, all behavioural tests proposed in this thesis are based on trained algorithm within
input REMs and VESs behaviours. To determine if these are capable of detecting REMs
and VESs that are not present in the initial dataset, unknown embedded systems (UESs)
are tested (Table 5.3). These UESs are chosen on the basis of their difference from the
REMs and VESs present in the initial dataset. The Google Nexus 5X has a six-core CPU
with a 64-bit architecture, whereas other Android-based devices in the initial dataset
had fewer cores with a 32-bit architecture. Whereas other VESs in the initial dataset
run under a Linux-based host system, the VirtualPC runs under a Windows-based host
system. Meanwhile, the VMware EXSi does not run under another OS, but uses a
hypervisor which runs directly on the real physical hardware. Finally, the Zsun WiFi
Card Reader is a very simple card reader which shares files via Wi-Fi, whereas other
REMs in the initial dataset were mostly development boards, smartphones and tablets
with more resources and capabilities. Furthermore, this card reader has a completely
different OS compared to other REMs in the initial dataset.
Figure 5.7 shows a complete summary of results obtained from all behavioural tests
proposed by including the classification of UESs. Results show that the final detection
algorithm proposed is not only capable of detecting VESs and the FTA, but also is able
to recognize REMs and VESs that were not present in the initial dataset. This proves
that the final detection method shown in Figure 5.8 is completely independent of the
machine architecture and its OS.
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Table 5.3: List of unknown real and virtual embedded systems.
System Architecture Operating System Type
Google Nexus 5X ARM Android REM
VirtualPC Embedded x86 OpenWRT VES
VMware EXSi Embedded x86 OpenWRT VES
Zsun WiFi Card Reader MIPS Zsun OS REM
REM: real embedded machine; VES: virtual or emulated embedded system.
Figure 5.7: Summary of results for all behavioural tests for 200 pings.
*Classification-based algorithm presented in Chapter 4; **RF and k -NN trained with
P.mode and P.median features.
5.6 Applicability of the Proposed Solution
In the follow subsections, the application of this solution with some architectural refer-
ence models for M2M communications in the IoT system is presented. How this solution
can protect M2M devices in IoT real-life scenarios is highlighted.
5.6.1 Architectural Reference Models
In the IoT there is necessity to incorporate trust management in all layers in the ar-
chitectural reference model. The final proposed solution presented in this thesis can be
applied in European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), oneM2M and ITU
as well as emerging trends in IoT such as Social IoT (SIoT), Virtualisation Continuum
(VC) and Fog Computing (FC).
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Figure 5.8: Final detection algorithm for detecting VESs, UESs and FTAs, in which
n is fixed to 200, x is fixed to 0.2 and TCh is fixed to 40 seconds.
The final proposed solution can be easily included in the ETSI and oneM2M archi-
tectural reference models. This will require the use of IoT trust agencies in the M2M
Device and Gateway Domain as part of M2M Applications. In the M2M/ITU architec-
tural reference model, this solution can be incorporated as part of the Specific Security
Capabilities targeting the Device layer. The functionality to request/receive the charac-
terisation can also be included in both the M2M Network Domain (ETSI and oneM2M)
and Network layer (ITU). This allows the IoT core to understand if the M2M-embedded
machines that are communicating are real or forged.
The final proposed solution can also be applied to the SIoT as part of the Social
agents which are already in the Gateway and Object. Moreover, it also can be in-
corporated into the Object interface solely for the purpose of requesting/receiving the
characterisation. In the VC, the IoT trust agencies can be included in the Physical
layer inside objects. Virtual objects in the Virtualisation layer can request/receive the
characterisation to ensure that objects in the Physical layer are real. This will allow
Virtual objects to represent only functionalities of real embedded machines. Lastly, the
final proposed solution can also be part of the FC in the Device layer and Fogs can
request/receive the characterisation for trusting objects in the Device layer.
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An overview of the IoT trust agencies that can request/receive the characterisation in
the IoT core and the IoT trust agencies and IoT mobile agents that can request/receive
and perform the characterisation in IoT/M2M devices is shown in Figure 5.9.
Figure 5.9: Final detection algorithm in IoT trust agencies for both the IoT core and
IoT/M2M-embedded devices, in which n is fixed to 200, x is fixed to 0.2 and TCh is
fixed to 40 seconds.
5.6.2 Implementation Feasibility
In this thesis, the proposed characterisation algorithms are based on the ping command.
This command is available in all IoT-embedded machines with the Internet protocol
suite implemented. These constitute the majority of embedded machines available in
the IoT. An example of IoT-embedded machines that do not support the characterisa-
tion algorithm are Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)-based sensors. However, these devices
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are currently not smart enough to implement advanced security mechanisms or to com-
municate directly to the IoT core.
For the purpose of this thesis, the characterisation algorithm presented is a bash
script running under Linux-based OSs (Appendix A.1), whereas MEDA, the
classification-based algorithm and the FTA detection algorithm are Python-based scripts
(Appendices A.3 and A.4). An example of output obtained by performing the charac-
terisation algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2.
In order to incorporate these algorithms in an IoT trust mobile agent and to use
them in real IoT scenarios, practical considerations are needed. Firstly, the proposed
final solution must be part of the IoT standard. Secondly, trusted third party entities will
be required to certify the agent. This will give IoT agencies the opportunity to validate
IoT mobile agents before performing the characterisation process. This procedure can
be implemented quite easily in embedded machines with an open-source OS, whereas for
proprietary embedded machines and OSs, each company must provide this certification
agent as part of their systems in order to be compatible with the standard.
The characterisation algorithm and MEDA can be easily used in almost all
IoT-embedded devices with a very small amount of memory, processing capability and
power. This is because these algorithms use basic mathematical functions and do not
require any previous knowledge to detect forged embedded machines.
The classification-based algorithm and the FTA detection algorithm are based on
pre-trained classifiers such as k -NN and RF. Authors in [253] proposed a k -NN algorithm
for an embedded machine with very low computation capabilities and resources, like a
microcontroller for real-time processing with a 32-bit ARM Cortex M3 processor at 72
MHz, with 512 KB of flash and 64 KB of RAM. This machine was also equipped with five
sensors: accelerometer, magnetometer, altimeter, temperature and force. Results from
their proposed solution show that the dimension of training and test sets is the key to
reducing the time and memory required for the classification. The latency introduced by
their proposed k -NN algorithm is 950 µsec with 9 KB of RAM, in which k is equal to 5.
A training set with 50 instances and a test set with 6 instances were used as parameters
for obtaining accuracy, which in this case was 92.7%. Authors in [254] showed an
implementation of RF for ARM- and FPGA-based architectures used in IoT-embedded
machines. Results for the embedded ARM show that for a pre-trained forest composed
of 50 decision trees, with 1349 nodes and around 675 paths between root and leaf nodes,
on 6000 training instances, 1 MHz CPU is needed to evaluate 300 samples per second
(around 3.3 kHz per sample). The flash memory required for storing the pre-trained
RF was in the order of a few megabytes. Therefore, it is clear that these classifiers
may require somewhat greater computational capabilities and relatively larger memory
resources compared to MEDA.
These aspects highlight that the proposed solution for detecting forged embedded
machines based on the characterisation algorithms, RF and k -NN, can be implemented
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in IoT-embedded machines with low computational capabilities and a small amount of
memory.
5.6.3 Real-Life Scenarios: Applicability
The applicability of the final proposed solution to real-life scenarios allows Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS), Intelligent Healthcare Systems (IHS) and Intelligent
Building Systems (IBS) to establish trust relationships among IoT/M2M-embedded ma-
chines in both open and closed networks.
Intelligent Transportation Systems
Attackers that aim to disrupt the traffic by using multiple forged embedded machines can
be detected by using the final proposed solution. IoT mobile trust agents in vehicles and
IoT mobile trust agents in the ITS core will be able to detect these forged machines. This
detection can, for example, block false traffic information sent by an attacker to other
vehicles and the ITS. Therefore, by distrusting this information, the ITS will continue
to work properly, suggesting the best route, preserving road safety and providing the
best in-vehicle entertainment.
Intelligent Healthcare Systems
The IHS and IoT-embedded machines such as smart body sensors, emergency vehicles
etc., can be protected by using the final proposed solution. With this, smart body
sensors and their controllers could detect the forged embedded machines attackers use
to send false body information. The IHS core could also distrust health information
from forged embedded machines, and therefore could send alerts to hospitals, patients
and emergency vehicles only during actual emergencies.
Intelligent Building Systems
The final proposed solution can also be used by the IBS. Smart building sensors and
actuators, and the IBS core could be able to detect possible attackers and distrust their
information. By detecting attacks, the IBS could, for example, provide the perfect room
conditions and the perfect occupancy of specific areas in the building and it will only
alert in the case of a real fire.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, an attack against behavioural tests was presented. This was termed a
Fake Timing Attack (FTA). This FTA involved using timing information from a real
embedded machine (REM) from the initial dataset in order to modify the kernel of a
powerful machine for the purpose of mimicking its timing behaviours.
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A detection model for uncovering the FTA based on the theoretical analysis gath-
ered by observing the modified kernel behaviour was then outlined. Metrics available for
detecting virtual and/or emulated embedded systems (VESs) were further analysed to
determine if the theoretical analysis was correct. The mode and median features from
the ping response time were then used to detect the FTA. A comparison of two classi-
fiers, k -NN and RF, trained by using these features for detecting an FTA was provided.
Results show that k -NN gave the best detection, with an overall detection performance
(ODP) of 93.70%. The final detection algorithm is able to recognise VESs and de-
tect FTAs in around 40 seconds, making it easily applicable to IoT/M2M-embedded
machines.
Furthermore, the final detection algorithm was tested with newer REMs and VESs
with completely different capabilities from the REMs and VESs present in the initial
dataset. This was done in order to determine if the algorithm was capable of detect-
ing unknown embedded machines (UESs) without previous knowledge of them. Results
show that the final detection algorithm can recognise unknown REMs and VESs, with an
overall detection performance of 99.96% and 99.92% respectively. This proves that the
final detection algorithm is capable not only of recognising VESs and detecting FTAs,
but also of recognising UESs. This makes it easily applicable to the detection of embed-
ded devices with black-box architectures and therefore to future IoT/M2M-embedded
machines.
Finally, the applicability of the final proposed solution to proposed IoT/M2M archi-
tectural reference models, current trends in the IoT and real-life scenarios was shown.
This confirmed that it can be easily applied to the detection of forged embedded machines
in the IoT, and also underlines its benefits in terms of trusting information received by
M2M-embedded machines.
In the next chapter, the conclusions of this thesis are provided. Contributions
and findings are also presented. Moreover, future works required to improve the way
IoT/M2M-embedded machines can successfully trust each other are suggested.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
The Internet of Things (IoT) is considered one of the most prominent Information and
Communication technologies to be used on a large scale. At its base there is the com-
munication among objects for achieving specific and complex goals. These objects rely
on Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications in order to exchange information. The
nature of IoT/M2M devices is mostly embedded with low computational capabilities,
and this increases their vulnerability. Therefore, a lack of security can dramatically
degrade the operation of an application system. This may have very negative effects,
including putting peoples’ lives at risk. Trust has been studied and has been identified
as a mechanism for securing M2M communications in the IoT.
In this thesis, a new solution is proposed to increase IoT security that can be easily
applied to the existing architectural reference models. Unlike current research on incor-
porating trust into the IoT system, this new solution is applicable to real IoT scenarios.
Moreover, this new solution can address a new and emerging threat against M2M com-
munications. This new threat was identified in this thesis and consists of using forged
embedded machines. These machines can be used for launching several simultaneous
misbehaviour attacks against trust management systems in order to disrupt the net-
work. It has been shown that the new solution can be applied to existing and proposed
standards for incorporating trust in the IoT.
Several research outputs for improving the security of M2M communications in the
IoT have been presented in this work:
• A study of the IoT ecosystem, identifying embedded machines as its critical part;
• An investigation into previously unconsidered threats against M2M communica-
tions in the IoT;
• The development of a characterisation algorithm for collecting reliable embedded
machine behaviours;
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• A study of embedded machine behaviours in order to obtain useful metrics for
creating trust relationships;
• The creation of two datasets with behaviours from real, virtual and emulated
embedded systems, which is the starting point for achieving reliable results;
• Implementation of methods for detecting newly discovered threats;
• A study of an attack against the proposed detection methods, along with a pro-
tection mechanism for its detection.
The results presented in Section 5.6 show that the final solution can be used in all the
proposed architectural reference models, making its applicability independent of them
and easily integrated during the standardisation process.
6.2 Contributions and Findings
A key contribution is that the methods proposed in this thesis are completely agnostic
to the machine type, its characteristics and the OS used. This is fundamental for their
application in present and future IoT-embedded systems, because it is not feasible to
know machine-related information a priori, as this can change and develop over time.
Furthermore, the adoption of these methods can be incorporated in IoT mobile trust
agents. This allows information to be secure directly as part of the smartness of the ob-
ject. In summary, findings from this thesis show that it is possible to establish reliable
communications among IoT/M2M-embedded machines in the presence of forged ma-
chines. Details of the main conclusions from this thesis are summarised in the following
subsections.
6.2.1 Introduction, Background and Related Work
This research began by identifying the characteristics of objects in the IoT in terms of
connectivity, computational capabilities etc. By analysing several network topologies
used for creating M2M communications, it became clear that linear topologies give
attackers the opportunity to easily intercept information.
The analysis of real-life scenarios with threats against “things” shows the impor-
tance of securing the system and protecting these objects. The study of architectural
reference models shows that there is a lack of standardisation in relation to the IoT.
This reduces adoption of the IoT in large-scale, real scenarios and makes implementing
security measures challenging.
An investigation of attacks against M2M devices has highlighted why security and
trust play an important role in M2M communications. The evaluation of current solu-
tions for incorporating trust in the IoT shows that these cannot be applied in real IoT
scenarios. There are several reasons why these solutions cannot be applied. Firstly, most
employ assumptions that are unrealistic in real environments, such as pre-trusted and
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invincible objects, objects able to overhear the traffic of its neighbours etc. Secondly,
most of them can be applied only in static networks, which limit their applicability in
many real IoT scenarios. Furthermore, most require objects with memory capabilities
that are rarely present in real IoT-embedded machines. Finally, and most importantly,
none of these solutions is able to distrust forged objects in the IoT network.
6.2.2 A New Threat and a Novel Solution: Machine Emulation Detec-
tion Algorithm
A new threat against M2M communications has been identified, showing a lack of pro-
tection in current TMFs in the IoT. This attack, which uses forged embedded machines,
gives attackers the opportunity to create a new subverted type of communication, iden-
tified as Machine-to-Fake Machine (M2FM) communication. This finding shows how
real-life scenarios can be attacked and how the IoT system can be compromised.
Therefore, a first detection mechanism against this attack has been identified by
studying embedded machine behaviours. Lack of previous studies and available datasets
show the urgency to protect the IoT system. The initial study of machine characteristics,
capabilities and network connectivities, were used for identifying trust metrics related
to the behaviours of machines rather than specific characteristics. This led to a new
method for characterising these behaviours and then using them as threshold values for
the detection. Results show that this mechanism is able to detect forged embedded
machines within 3 minutes with a detection accuracy of 79.21% [6].
6.2.3 A Classification Approach to Detecting Illegitimate Embedded
Machines
The long time required by the first detection method (MEDA) led to a search for an
alternative approach to improving the characterisation of embedded machine behaviours.
The moderate detection uncertainty and low recognition of real embedded machines also
led to the identification of a new approach for detecting forged embedded machines.
The new method employs machine learning algorithms, which can use more than one
behaviour metric per time, greatly improving detection. A new evaluation method for
understanding which algorithm behaves correctly was therefore proposed. This shows
that k -NN performs well when a few trust metrics are used and that RF performs well
in almost all the other cases. Results show that by using RF with 10 metrics, it is
possible to detect forged embedded machines with an overall detection performance
(ODP) greater than 99.5% within only 5 seconds; this can rise to around 99.9% within
40 seconds [110].
6.2.4 Attack and Defence in Behavioural Tests
The two detection methods proposed in this thesis collect behaviours from real embedded
machines and use these to detect forged embedded machines. This led to the study of
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a possible attack in which real embedded machines are mimicked by replicating their
behaviour inside a modified powerful machine. This study shows that previous detection
methods can be defeated by perpetrating this attack, referred to as fake timing attack.
A detailed analysis of the trust metrics retrieved by launching the attack revealed that
two metrics, mode and median from ping response time, are critical in detecting this
attack. These metrics were used by k -NN for the detection, giving an ODP value of
93.70% within 40 seconds.
Further evaluations demonstrate that RF is able to recognise real and forged em-
bedded machines that were previously not present in the initial dataset. This aspect
shows that the proposed solution can be easily applied to future IoT/M2M-embedded
machines and that it is completely agnostic in relation to the machine’s architecture
and OS. Results show that the proposed solution can detect unknown forged embedded
machines with an ODP value of around 99.9% within 40 seconds.
Finally, the combination of RF and k -NN for detecting known and unknown forged
embedded machines, and the fake timing attack can be completed within 40 seconds
with an ODP value of 99.89%, 99.92% and 93.70% respectively. These results show that
this solution can be used to create reliable trust relationships among M2M devices in the
IoT. By using this solution as a method of pre-trust evaluation of IoT/M2M-embedded
machines, trustor machines will save energy and time [111].
6.3 Future Work
The findings in this thesis clearly indicate that the IoT is not yet ready to be deployed.
However, it clearly is being deployed, therefore attackers can exploit its lack of security
for malicious purposes. The trust management frameworks that are currently avail-
able are not capable of fully creating trust relationships among objects, which leads to
the need for further investigations in this direction. For this purpose, a standardised
architectural reference model for the IoT and M2M communications is needed. This
void prevents researchers from creating a proper security level in the IoT architecture,
nurturing the development of ad hoc solutions.
The solution proposed in this thesis for detecting forged embedded machines in the
IoT can be used as a method of pre-trust evaluation. However, it must be included as
part of a high-level trust management framework. This trust management framework
can use the proposed solution and at the same time detect other attacks. The combi-
nation of multi-layer metrics to detect attacks against trust mechanisms has not been
properly studied yet. Similarly, studies about propagating trust to other M2M devices
depending on the pre-trust evaluation must be carried out.
The binary classification approach used in this thesis can be modified to a multiclass
classification to recognise the specific system type used by REMs and VESs. In this
scenario, a further trust assessment can be created by exchanging the embedded machine
type during the initial interaction. The trustor will request details of the trustee’s system
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type and will be able to detect if the trustee is providing the timing information that
corresponds to that system. Therefore, the trustor will be able to determine if the
trustee is using a specific embedded machine, such as Raspberry Pi, Arduino etc., or
a specific virtual or an emulated system to create forged embedded machines, such as
VirtualBox, QEMU etc.
This solution can also be modified for application to other fields. For example, it
can be used to detect the Android’s Dalvik virtual machine more quickly than existing
heuristic detection methods [219, 220], which require around 20 minutes. By contrast,
the proposed solution requires only circa 40 seconds, and is therefore more than 20 times
faster.
The application of IoT mobile trust agents could be further investigated by applying
the proposed solution to different IoT scenarios. Its application can also be evaluated
with both open and closed networks in order to properly appreciate the dangerousness of
the attack and the effectiveness of the solution. The ratio between ODP and ODS used
in Equation 4.4 (Section 4.2.6) should be changed in order to identify the best classifier
for each level of security required (Table 4.8). Further tests with high priority traffic
should be performed during the simulations of the proposed solution in order to check if
this affects the kernel behaviour and therefore detection results. Finally, other solutions
based on timing behaviours should be evaluated for M2M-embedded devices that do not
support the ping command locally, such as devices based only on IEEE 802.15.4, LoRa,
LTE etc.
6.4 Summary
In this thesis, an overview of the Internet of Things is provided. The focus is on is-
sues which prevent the creation of trusted relationships among IoT-embedded machines
in M2M communications. It has been shown that the lack of a standard architectural
reference model for incorporating trust prevents researchers from providing an optimal
Trust Management Framework for the IoT. A new threat consisting of forged embedded
machines used by attackers to subvert M2M communication has been identified. Sev-
eral new solutions were proposed as part of IoT mobile trust agents in order to allow
M2M-embedded machines and the IoT core to identify this attack. This is achieved by
performing a pre-trust evaluation in order to save energy and computational resources
when creating trust relationships.
Evaluations and results of the final proposed solution show its efficiency in terms
of overall detection speed, overall detection performance and resilience against attacks,
independent of the machine architecture and its OS. The detection of unknown embedded
machines demonstrates its easy applicability to future IoT-embedded machines and also
in a final standardised architecture reference model for M2M communications in the
IoT. Finally, as demonstrated, this trust evaluation can be used by IoT applications to
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preserve their operations in real-life scenarios. These are very important aspects because
IoT does not connect only machines, but also people’s lives.
Appendix A
Appendices
A.1 Characterisation Algorithm
#!/bin/sh
#
# Copyright 2015 Valerio Selis
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License ,
or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
License
# along with this program; if not , see <http ://www.gnu.org/
licenses/>.
#
# Usage: characterisation.sh <sim_number > <ping_number > <
ping_interval > <ping_pkt_size >
#
# Check if the OS is Android
check_android=$(ls /sdcard)
# Check if the OS is NetBSD
check_netbsd=$(uname -a | grep "evb")
# Check if WNDR4700 is the real embedded machine
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check_WNDR4700=$(uname -a | grep "WNDR4700")
# Select the folder for saving the log file
if [ "$check_android" = "" ];then
if [ "$check_WNDR4700" = "" ];then
main_log="/tmp/simping.log"
main_dir="/tmp/"
else
# WNDR4700
main_log="/tmp/mnt/sda1/simping.log"
main_dir="/tmp/mnt/sda1/"
fi
else
# Android OS
main_log="/sdcard/simping.log"
main_dir="/sdcard/"
fi
echo "Starting $(date) - $(date +%s)..."
echo "Starting $(date) - $(date +%s)..." >> $main_log
# Retrieve number of CPUs and cores
if [ "$check_netbsd" = "" ];then
cpus=$(cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep processor | awk ’{print $NF}’)
else
cpus=$(sysctl -a | egrep -i ’hw.machine|hw.model|hw.ncpu ’ |
grep "hw.ncpu:" | awk {’print $NF ’})
fi
max_cpus=$(echo $cpus | awk {’print $NF ’})
if [ "$max_cpus" = "" ];then
cpus=0
max_cpus =0
fi
# Number of simulation loops , minimum 1 loop
number_start =0
number_end =1
if [ "$1" != "" ];then
# Number of loops given in input
number_end=$1
fi
# Number of pings , default 1000
number_pings =1000
if [ "$2" != "" ];then
# Number of pings given in input
number_pings=$2
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fi
# Interval number between pings , default 0.2
interval_pings =0.2
if [ "$3" != "" ];then
# Interval number between pings given in input
interval_pings=$3
fi
# Ping packet size , default 56 bytes
pkt_size =56
if [ "$4" != "" ];then
# Ping packet size given in input
pkt_size=$4
fi
end_sim=’n’
while [ $end_sim != ’y’ ];do
# Execute 2 simulations
# - Sim 0: ping
# - Sim 1: ping and CPU under stress
echo "Simulation loop #$number_start $(date) - $(date +%s)" >>
$main_log
sim_count =0
ready=’n’
while [ $ready != ’y’ ];do
ts=$(date +%s)
sim=""
sim_dir=""
# Start the dd command if necessary for stressing the CPU
if [ $sim_count -eq 1 ];then
for each in $cpus;do
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/null &
done
sim="02_$ts"
sim_dir="ping_dd_$sim"
echo "Sim #$sim_count: ping -c $number_pings -i
$interval_pings -s $pkt_size 127.0.0.1 with dd ($ts)" >>
$main_log
else
sim="1000 _$ts"
sim_dir="ping_$sim"
echo "Sim #$sim_count: ping -c $number_pings -i
$interval_pings -s $pkt_size 127.0.0.1 ($ts)" >> $main_log
fi
# Start the characterisation algorithm depending on the OS
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if [ "$check_netbsd" = "" ];then
# Start the characterisation algorithm
echo "Start characterisation: $(date) - $(date +%s)"
echo "Start characterisation: $(date) - $(date +%s)"
>> "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/log"
ping -c $number_pings -i $interval_pings -s $pkt_size
127.0.0.1 | while read LINE
do
# Store ping response time
echo "$LINE"
# Store timestamp value
echo "$(date +%s)" >> "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/lo_ts"
# Store CPU usage
cat /proc/stat | grep ’^cpu ’ >> "/$main_dir/
$sim_dir/lo_cpu"
done > "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/lo_ping"
# Stop the characterisation algorithm
echo "Characterisation finished! $(date) - $(date +%s)
"
echo "Characterisation finished! $(date) - $(date +%s)
" >> "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/log"
sleep 1s
else
# Start iostat for retrieving the CPU usage
iostat -C 1 > "/$main_dir/$dir/iostat.txt" &
iostat_pid=$!
# Make sure iostat.txt contains an up to date CPU
usage
sleep 1s
# Start the characterisation for NetBSD
echo "Start characterisation: $(date) - $(date +%s)"
echo "Start characterisation: $(date) - $(date +%s)"
>> "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/log"
ping -c $number_pings -i $interval_pings -s $pkt_size
127.0.0.1 | while read LINE
do
# Store ping response time
echo "$LINE"
# Store timestamp value
echo "$(date +%s)" >> "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/lo_ts"
# Store CPU usage
tail -1 "/$main_dir/$dir/iostat.txt" | tr "\n" " "
>> "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/lo_cpu"
done > "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/lo_ping"
# Stop the characterisation algorithm for NetBSD
echo "Characterisation finished! $(date) - $(date +%s)
"
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echo "Characterisation finished! $(date) - $(date +%s)
" >> "/$main_dir/$sim_dir/log"
# Kill iostat
kill $iostat_pid
sleep 1s
fi
# Kill all dd commands if it is Sim 1
if [ $sim_count -eq 1 ];then
killall dd
fi
# Increase the simulation number
sim_count=$(( $sim_count +1))
# Check if two simulations were executed
if [ $sim_count -eq 2 ];then
echo "Finished two simulations for loop: $number_start
of $number_end!"
echo "Finished two simulations for loop: $number_start
of $number_end!" >> $main_log
# Restart simulation counter
sim_count =0
ready=’y’
fi
done
# Increase the simulation loop counter
number_start=$(( $number_start +1))
# Check if all simulation loops were executed
if [ $number_start -eq $number_end ];then
echo "Finished! Goodbye :)"
echo "Finished! Goodbye :)" >> $main_log
end_sim=’y’
fi
done
exit
A.2 Characterisation Algorithm Outputs
File with ping response time (lo ping)
Line# | Data
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 | PING 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
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2 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =1 ttl=64 time =0.260 ms
3 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =2 ttl=64 time =0.216 ms
4 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =3 ttl=64 time =0.210 ms
5 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =4 ttl=64 time =0.209 ms
6 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =5 ttl=64 time =0.211 ms
7 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =6 ttl=64 time =0.213 ms
8 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =7 ttl=64 time =0.201 ms
9 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =8 ttl=64 time =0.210 ms
10 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =9 ttl =64 time =0.207 ms
.... ....
996 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =995 ttl=64 time =0.194 ms
997 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =996 ttl=64 time =0.216 ms
998 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =997 ttl=64 time =0.212 ms
999 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =998 ttl=64 time =0.200 ms
1000 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =999 ttl =64 time =0.213 ms
1001 | 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_req =1000 ttl =64 time =0.216
ms
1002 |
1003 | --- 127.0.0.1 ping statistics ---
1004 | 1000 packets transmitted , 1000 received , 0% packet loss ,
time 199796 ms
1005 | rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.184/0.213/0.339/0.010 ms
File with timestamp values (lo ts)
Line# | Data
------------------
1 | 1433860111
2 | 1433860111
3 | 1433860111
4 | 1433860111
5 | 1433860111
6 | 1433860112
7 | 1433860112
8 | 1433860112
9 | 1433860112
10 | 1433860112
11 | 1433860113
.... ....
996 | 1433860310
997 | 1433860310
998 | 1433860310
999 | 1433860310
1000 | 1433860311
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1001 | 1433860311
1002 | 1433860311
1003 | 1433860311
1004 | 1433860311
1005 | 1433860311
A.3 Machine Emulation Detection Algorithm
#!/usr/bin/python
# -*- coding: utf -8 -*-
#
# Copyright 2015 Valerio Selis
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License ,
or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
License
# along with this program; if not , see <http ://www.gnu.org/
licenses/>.
#
# Usage: python MEDA.py <ping response time > <timestamp values >
#
# Import Python modules
import timeit , sys , string
import numpy as np
# Check inputs
if len(sys.argv) != 3:
print "Usage: python " + str(sys.argv [0]) + " <lo_ping > <lo_ts
>"
exit()
# Initialise characterisation metrics for ping response time (P)
and timestamp values (T)
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## Min
PMinL = 0.067
PMinU = 0.193
TminL = 0.0
TminU = 0.0
## Max
PMaxL = 0.140
PMaxU = 2.060
TMaxL = 1.0
TMaxU = 2.0
## Range
PRangeL = 0.061
PRangeU = 1.993
## Sum
PSumL = 99.064
PSumU = 288.117
TSumL = 199.0
TSumU = 201.0
## Mean
PMeanL = 0.099
PMeanU = 0.288
TMeanL = 0.199
TMeanU = 0.201
## Variance
PVarL = 0.0
PVarU = 0.034
TVarL = 0.159
TVarU = 0.162
## Standard Deviation (SD)
PStdL = 0.002
PStdU = 0.183
TStdL = 0.399
TStdU = 0.402
## Mean -Standard Deviation (Mean -SD)
PMeanStdL = 0.060
PMeanStdU = 0.215
## Mean+Standard Deviation (Mean+SD)
PMeanStdpL = 0.110
PMeanStdpU = 0.452
# Store the time
start_time = timeit.default_timer ()
# Load ping response time and timestamp values from the target
machine in the dictionary
## Ping response time
TargetP = []
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with open(str(sys.argv [1]), ’rb’) as textfile:
pr = textfile.readlines ()
for row in pr:
ping = string.split(str(row), ’=’)
if len(ping) == 4:
TargetP.append(float(ping [3]. replace(’\r\n’, ’’).
replace(’ping’, ’’).replace(’ms’, ’’)))
## Timestamp values
TargetT = []
with open(str(sys.argv [2]), ’rb’) as textfile:
pr = textfile.readlines ()
ts = []
i = 0
for row in pr:
ts.append(row.replace(’\n’, ’’))
if i == 1:
TargetT.append (0)
elif i <= 1001:
TargetT.append(int(ts[i])-int(ts[i-1]))
i += 1
# Extract target characterisation metrics from ping response time
and timestamp values
## Min
TargetPMin = min(TargetP)
TargetTMin = min(TargetT)
## Max
TargetPMax = max(TargetP)
TargetTMax = max(TargetT)
## Range
TargetPRange = TargetPMax - TargetPMin
## Sum
TargetPSum = sum(TargetP)
TargetTSum = sum(TargetT)
## Mean
TargetPMean = np.mean(TargetP)
TargetTMean = np.mean(TargetT)
## Variance
TargetPVar = np.var(TargetP)
TargetTVar = np.var(TargetT)
## Standard Deviation (SD)
TargetPStd = np.std(TargetP)
TargetTStd = np.std(TargetT)
## Mean -Standard Deviation (Mean -SD)
TargetPMeanStd = TargetPMean - TargetPStd
## Mean+Standard Deviation (Mean+SD)
TargetPMeanStdp = TargetPMean + TargetPStd
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# Detection thresholds
real = 0
virtual = 0
if PMinL <= TargetPMin <= PMinU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if PMaxL <= TargetPMax <= PMaxU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if PRangeL <= TargetPRange <= PRangeU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if PSumL <= TargetPSum <= PSumU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if PMeanL <= TargetPMean <= PMeanU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if PVarL <= TargetPVar <= PVarU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if PStdL <= TargetPStd <= PStdU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if PMeanStdL <= TargetPMeanStd <= PMeanStdU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if PMeanStdpL <= TargetPMeanStdp <= PMeanStdpU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if TminL <= TargetTMin <= TminU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if TMaxL <= TargetTMax <= TMaxU:
real = real + 1
else:
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virtual = virtual + 1
if TSumL <= TargetTSum <= TSumU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if TMeanL <= TargetTMean <= TMeanU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if TVarL <= TargetTVar <= TVarU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if TStdL <= TargetTStd <= TStdU:
real = real + 1
else:
virtual = virtual + 1
if virtual == 0:
print "The target embedded machine is a REM"
else:
print "The target embedded machine is a VES"
# Calculate the time required to detect if the target embedded
machine is a REMs or VESs
print "Time required by MEDA: " + str(timeit.default_timer () -
start_time) + " (s)\n"
exit()
A.4 Classification-based Algorithm
#!/usr/bin/python
# -*- coding: utf -8 -*-
#
# Copyright 2015 Valerio Selis
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License ,
or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
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# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
License
# along with this program; if not , see <http ://www.gnu.org/
licenses/>.
#
# Usage: python classification.py <dictionary.pkl > <FSM[ERT|L1FS]>
<CM[kNN|RF]> <num_pings [25|200] >
#
# Import Python modules
import timeit , cPickle , sys
import sklearn
import sklearn.cross_validation as cv
import sklearn.neighbors as nb
from sklearn import metrics
from sklearn.ensemble import RandomForestClassifier
# Classification of REMs and VESs by using k-NN or RF, where:
# - X: target dataset (REMs and VESs) with features extracted by
the features selection method (FSM) for specified number of
pings
# - y: target values (0: REM , 1: VES)
# - FSM: features selection method (ERT or L1-FS)
# - CM: classification method (k-NN or RF)
# - num_pings: number of pings (25 or 200)
def Classification_algorithm(X, y, FSM , CM , num_pings):
if FSM == "ERT":
# ERT
if num_pings == 25:
# 25 pings
# k-NN
n_neighbors = 4
weights = ’distance ’
# RF
max_features = ’sqrt’
n_estimators = 500
else:
# 200 pings
# k-NN
n_neighbors = 2
weights = ’uniform ’
# RF
max_features = ’sqrt’
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n_estimators = 1000
else:
# L1 -FS
if num_pings == 25:
# 25 pings
# k-NN
n_neighbors = 1
weights = ’uniform ’
# RF
max_features = ’sqrt’
n_estimators = 1000
else:
# 200 pings
# k-NN
n_neighbors = 1
weights = ’uniform ’
# RF
max_features = ’sqrt’
n_estimators = 500
start_time = timeit.default_timer ()
# Split the dataset in two part: trainset (75%) and testset
(25%)
X_train , X_test , y_train , y_test = cv.train_test_split(X, y,
test_size =0.25 , random_state =0)
split_time = timeit.default_timer () - start_time
if CM == "kNN":
start_time = timeit.default_timer ()
knc = nb.KNeighborsClassifier(n_neighbors=n_neighbors ,
weights=weights)
knc.fit(X_train , y_train)
y_pred = knc.predict(X_test)
classification_time = timeit.default_timer () - start_time
A = metrics.accuracy_score(y_test , y_pred)
P, R, F1 , support = metrics.
precision_recall_fscore_support(y_test , y_pred)
ODP = float(A + P[0] + R[0] + F1[0] + P[1] + R[1] + F1[1])
/7.0)
# Caclulate the time required to classify all machines (
REMs and VESs) in the dataset
print "Time required by k-NN: " + str(classification_time)
+ " (s)\n"
# Display Accuracy , Precision , Recoll and F1-score for
both REMs and VESs
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print "A: " + str(A)
print "P_REM: " + str(P[0])
print "R_REM: " + str(R[0])
print "F1_REM: " + str(F1[0])
print "P_VES: " + str(P[1])
print "R_VES: " + str(R[1])
print "F1_VES: " + str(F1[1])
print "Support REM: " + str(support [0])
print "Support VES: " + str(support [1])
# Display ODP
print "ODP: " + str(ODP)
elif CM == "RF":
start_time = timeit.default_timer ()
rfc = RandomForestClassifier(n_estimators=n_estimators ,
max_features=max_features , random_state =0)
rfc.fit(X_train , y_train)
y_pred = rfc.predict(X_test)
classification_time = timeit.default_timer () - start_time
A = metrics.accuracy_score(y_test , y_pred)
P, R, F1 , support = metrics.
precision_recall_fscore_support(y_test , y_pred)
ODP = float(A + P[0] + R[0] + F1[0] + P[1] + R[1] + F1[1])
/7.0)
# Caclulate the time required to classify all machines (
REMs and VESs) in the dataset
print "Time required by RF: " + str(classification_time) +
" (s)\n"
# Display Accuracy , Precision , Recoll and F1-score for
both REMs and VESs
print "A: " + str(A)
print "P_REM: " + str(P[0])
print "R_REM: " + str(R[0])
print "F1_REM: " + str(F1[0])
print "P_VES: " + str(P[1])
print "R_VES: " + str(R[1])
print "F1_VES: " + str(F1[1])
print "Support REM: " + str(support [0])
print "Support VES: " + str(support [1])
# Display ODP
print "ODP: " + str(ODP)
# Check inputs
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if len(sys.argv) != 5:
print "Usage: python " + str(sys.argv [0]) + " <dictionary.pkl >
<FSM[ERT|L1FS]> <CM[kNN|RF]> <num_pings [25|200] >"
exit()
# Dictionary initialisation with list of all machines (REMs and
VESs) and their characterisations
with open(str(sys.argv [1]), ’rb’) as pklfile:
dictionary = cPickle.load(pklfile)
# Retrieve from the dictionary the normilised X, which contains
features selected by FSM for specific number of pings
X = dictionary["X_" + str(sys.argv [2]) + str(sys.argv [4])]
# Retrieve from the dictionary y
y = dictionary["y_" + str(sys.argv [2]) + str(sys.argv [4])]
# Feature selection method used
FSM = str(sys.argv [2])
# Classification method to be used for classifying REMs and VESs
CM = str(sys.argv [3])
# Number of pings used by the characterisation algorithm
num_pings = str(sys.argv [4])
# Launch the classification algorithm
Classification_algorithm(X, y, FSM , CM , num_pings)
exit()
A.5 Architecture-based Timing Test on Raspberry Pi 2
model B
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#define BCM2708_PERI_BASE 0x3F000000
// Read the cycle count register (CCNT)
static inline unsigned int get_cyclecount (void) {
unsigned int value;
asm volatile ("MRC p15 , 0, %0, C9 , C13 , 0\t\n": "=r"(value));
return value;
}
// Enable all counters (including cycle counter)
static inline void init_perfcounters (int32_t do_reset , int32_t
enable_divider) {
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int32_t value = 1;
// Peform reset:
if (do_reset) {
value |= 2; // Reset all counters to zero
value |= 4; // Reset cycle counter to zero
}
if (enable_divider)
value |= 8; // Enable "by 64" divider for CCNT
value |= 16;
// Program the performance -counter control -register
asm volatile ("MCR p15 , 0, %0, c9 , c12 , 0\t\n" :: "r"(value));
// Enable all counters
asm volatile ("MCR p15 , 0, %0, c9 , c12 , 1\t\n" :: "r"(0 x8000000f
));
// Clear overflows
asm volatile ("MCR p15 , 0, %0, c9 , c12 , 3\t\n" :: "r"(0 x8000000f
));
}
// Perform the Architecture -based Timing Test
static int __init eacc_init(void) {
long int time_nop = 0;
long int time_access_sctlr;
long int difference_nop_sctlr;
// Disable counter overflow interrupts (just in case)
asm ("MCR p15 , 0, %0, C9 , C14 , 2\n\t" :: "r"(0 x8000000f));
printk(KERN_INFO "Architecture -based Timing Test kernel module
loaded\n");
init_perfcounters (1, 0);
// Measure the time of a NOP operation
time_nop = get_cyclecount ();
time_nop = get_cyclecount () - time_nop;
// Measure the time to access system control register (SCTLR)
time_access_sctlr = get_cyclecount ();
asm volatile ("MRC p15 , 0, %0, c1 , c0 , 0\t\n" : "=r"(c1) ::);
time_access_sctlr = get_cyclecount () - time_access_sctlr;
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printk(KERN_INFO "Time of a NOP operation: %ld\n", time_nop);
printk(KERN_INFO "Time to access the SCTLR: %ld\n",
time_access_sctlr);
return 0;
}
static void __exit eacc_exit(void) {
printk(KERN_INFO "Architecture -based Timing Test kernel module
unloaded\n");
}
module_init(eacc_init);
module_exit(eacc_exit);
A.6 Architecture-based Timing Test: QEMU patch
// Patch for the ’qemu -2.12.0 - rc0/target/arm/helper.c’ file
...
uint64_t fake_counter = 0;
...
void pmccntr_sync(CPUARMState *env)
{
uint64_t temp_ticks;
temp_ticks = muldiv64(qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL),
ARM_CPU_FREQ , NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND);
if (env ->cp15.c9_pmcr & PMCRD) {
/* Increment once every 64 processor clock cycles */
temp_ticks /= 64;
}
if (arm_ccnt_enabled(env)) {
env ->cp15.c15_ccnt = temp_ticks - env ->cp15.c15_ccnt;
}
fake_counter = 0;
}
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static uint64_t pmccntr_read(CPUARMState *env , const ARMCPRegInfo
*ri)
{
uint64_t total_ticks;
if (! arm_ccnt_enabled(env)) {
/* Counter is disabled , do not change value */
return env ->cp15.c15_ccnt;
}
total_ticks = muldiv64(qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL),
ARM_CPU_FREQ , NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND);
if (env ->cp15.c9_pmcr & PMCRD) {
/* Increment once every 64 processor clock cycles */
total_ticks /= 64;
}
if (fake_counter == 0 || fake_counter == 3)
total_ticks = 2;
else if (fake_counter == 1)
total_ticks = 3;
else if (fake_counter == 2)
total_ticks = 0;
else if (fake_counter == 4)
total_ticks = 4;
fake_counter ++;
return total_ticks - env ->cp15.c15_ccnt;
}
...
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B.1 Performance Results from MEDA, k-NN and RF
Table B.1: MEDA performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 1000 pings
(dataset of REMs from Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2).
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.4455 0.6164
0.7921 78.03%
VES 0.7504 1.0000 0.8574
Average 0.8752 0.7228 0.7369
Table B.2: MEDA performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.5340 1.0000 0.6962
0.6728 71.78%
VES 1.0000 0.4764 0.6454
Average 0.7670 0.7382 0.6708
Table B.3: ERT+k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9878 0.9810 0.9844
0.9846 98.46%
VES 0.9815 0.9881 0.9848
Average 0.9847 0.9846 0.9846
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Table B.4: L1-FS+k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9842 0.9814 0.9828
0.9830 98.30%
VES 0.9818 0.9845 0.9832
Average 0.9830 0.9830 0.9830
Table B.5: ERT+RF performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9968 0.9952 0.9960
0.9960 99.60%
VES 0.9953 0.9968 0.9960
Average 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960
Table B.6: L1-FS+RF performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9968 0.9952 0.9960
0.9960 99.60%
VES 0.9953 0.9968 0.9960
Average 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960
Table B.7: MEDA performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.6083 1.0000 0.7564
0.7585 78.53%
VES 1.0000 0.6136 0.7605
Average 0.8041 0.8068 0.7585
Table B.8: ERT+k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 200
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9900 0.9964 0.9932
0.9932 99.32%
VES 0.9964 0.9901 0.9932
Average 0.9932 0.9932 0.9932
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Table B.9: L1-FS+k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 200
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9955 0.9899 0.9927
0.9928 99.28%
VES 0.9901 0.9956 0.9929
Average 0.9928 0.9928 0.9928
Table B.10: ERT+RF performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 200
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9996 0.9976 0.9986
0.9986 99.86%
VES 0.9976 0.9996 0.9986
Average 0.9986 0.9986 0.9986
Table B.11: L1-FS+RF performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 200
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9992 0.9976 0.9984
0.9984 99.84%
VES 0.9976 0.9992 0.9984
Average 0.9984 0.9984 0.9984
Table B.12: MEDA performance results on recognising unknown REMs and VESs
for 25 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000
0.5000 57.14%
VES 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Average 0.5000 0.7500 0.5000
Table B.13: ERT+k -NN performance results on recognising unknown REMs and
VESs for 25 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.8075 0.8821
0.9005 94.00%
VES 1.0000 0.9935 0.9967
Average 1.0000 0.9005 0.9394
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Table B.14: L1-FS+k -NN performance results on recognising unknown REMs and
VESs for 25 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.8960 0.9420
0.9360 96.26%
VES 1.0000 0.9760 0.9879
Average 1.0000 0.9360 0.9649
Table B.15: ERT+RF performance results on recognising unknown REMs and VESs
for 25 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.9585 0.9786
0.9750 98.56%
VES 1.0000 0.9915 0.9957
Average 1.0000 0.9750 0.9872
Table B.16: L1-FS+RF performance results on recognising unknown REMs and VESs
for 25 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.4008 0.5723
0.9850 99.14%
VES 1.0000 0.9935 0.9967
Average 1.0000 0.6972 0.7845
Table B.17: MEDA performance results on recognising unknown REMs and VESs
for 200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.7750 0.5005 0.2760
0.5003 72.17%
VES 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Average 0.8875 0.7503 0.6380
Table B.18: ERT+k -NN performance results on recognising unknown REMs and
VESs for 200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.9775 0.9885
0.9783 98.75%
VES 1.0000 0.9790 0.9893
Average 1.0000 0.9783 0.9889
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Table B.19: L1-FS+k -NN performance results on recognising unknown REMs and
VESs for 200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.9635 0.9811
0.9793 98.80%
VES 1.0000 0.9950 0.9975
Average 1.0000 0.9793 0.9893
Table B.20: ERT+RF performance results on recognising unknown REMs and VESs
for 200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.9995 0.9997
0.9990 99.94%
VES 1.0000 0.9985 0.9992
Average 1.0000 0.9990 0.9995
Table B.21: L1-FS+RF performance results on recognising unknown REMs and VESs
for 200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 1.0000 0.9410 0.9687
0.9700 98.26%
VES 1.0000 0.9990 0.9995
Average 1.0000 0.9700 0.9841
Table B.22: k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and FTAs for 200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.0000 0.0600 0.0011
0.9410 95.44%
FTA 1.0000 0.9400 0.9700
Average 1.0000 0.0600 0.1100
Table B.23: RF performance results on recognising REMs and FTAs for 200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.0000 0.6500 0.2100
0.3480 53.97%
FTA 1.0000 0.3500 0.5200
Average 1.0000 0.6500 0.7900
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B.2 Performance Results from k-NN and RF without the
Normalisation Step
Table B.24: ERT+k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9818 0.9810 0.9814
0.9816 98.16%
VES 0.9814 0.9822 0.9818
Average 0.9816 0.9816 0.9816
Table B.25: L1-FS+k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9471 0.9608 0.9539
0.9540 95.40%
VES 0.9610 0.9473 0.9541
Average 0.9540 0.9541 0.9540
Table B.26: ERT+RF performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9956 0.9943 0.9950
0.9846 99.35%
VES 0.9945 0.9956 0.9950
Average 0.9950 0.9950 0.9950
Table B.27: L1-FS+RF performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 25
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9919 0.9943 0.9931
0.9846 99.20%
VES 0.9944 0.9921 0.9933
Average 0.9932 0.9932 0.9932
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Table B.28: ERT+k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 200
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9830 0.9802 0.9816
0.9818 98.18%
VES 0.9806 0.9834 0.9820
Average 0.9818 0.9818 0.9818
Table B.29: L1-FS+k -NN performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for
200 pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9783 0.9806 0.9794
0.9796 97.96%
VES 0.9809 0.9786 0.9798
Average 0.9796 0.9796 0.9796
Table B.30: ERT+RF performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 200
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9996 0.9984 0.9990
0.9846 99.69%
VES 0.9984 0.9996 0.9990
Average 0.9990 0.9990 0.9990
Table B.31: L1-FS+RF performance results on recognising REMs and VESs for 200
pings.
Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy ODP
REM 0.9984 0.9976 0.9980
0.9846 99.61%
VES 0.9976 0.9984 0.9980
Average 0.9980 0.9980 0.9980
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B.3 Cumulative Frequency Histograms for Timestamp Fea-
tures used to Detect FTA
(a) Minimum value of T. (b) Maximum value of T.
(c) Sum of T. values. (d) Mean of T. values.
(e) Mode of T. values. (f) Median of T. values.
Figure B.1: Cumulative frequency histograms for T. features obtained from the Ar-
duino Yu´n and FTA for 200 pings and 1000 characterisation tests.
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(g) Range of T. values. (h) Variance of T. values.
(i) Standard deviation of T. values. (j) Upper bound (95%) of T. values.
(k) Lower bound (95%) of T. values. (l) Skewness of T. values.
(m) Kurtosis of T. values. (n) Pearson correlation coefficient of T. val-
ues.
Figure B.1: (continued) Cumulative frequency histograms for T. features obtained
from the Arduino Yu´n and FTA for 200 pings and 1000 characterisation tests.
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